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Is the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act Itself a
Secret, and Is the Act Worth Protecting?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, the owner of several North Carolina travel
agencies developed what he considered a novel business plan:' he
envisioned'a scheme that combined the services of a travel agency
with those of a bank.2 Under this scheme, a customer would plan a
vacation and deposit a minimum of fifty dollars per month in an
escrow account for a set period preceding departure3 When the
account contained an amount equal to sixty percent of the anticipated
vacation expenses, the remaining forty percent would be loaned to
the vacationer The loan would be interest-free, with the repayment
period equaling the amount of time it had taken the customer to save
the initial sixty percent5
After implementing this strategy at his own agencies, Jack
Amariglio-Dunn marketed his concept to other travel companies and
approached local banks for additional financial resources.6 The banks
were unreceptive.7 In 1991 he responded to an advertisement seeking
candidates for a managerial position at Banc One Travel Corporation
("Banc One"), an Ohio travel agency. At that time, he also proposed
a cooperative venture with Banc One.8 When a director of travel
management for Banc One later contacted Mr. Amariglio-Dunn, he
explained his idea to the executive and resubmitted its associated
promotional materials.9 When he found out that the company turned
1. See Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, 802 F. Supp. 1358, 1358 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd
sub nom. Amariglio-Dunn v. McCoy, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the plaintiff
considered his idea to be unique, the court disagreed. "[lit seems plain that anyone with
reasonable skill in the [banking] field could divine and copy the basic concept of the plan
based on plaintiff's own promotional materials." Id at 1360.






8. See id. at 1359.
9. See id.
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down his proposal, Mr. Amariglio-Dunn sued the company to prevent
it from wrongfully using his scheme without compensating him.10
Although Mr. Amariglio-Dunn's claim did not succeed for
several reasons," his attempt to recover under the North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act provides an interesting introduction to
the law of trade secrets protection. 2 Trade secrets law aims to restrict
the dissemination of confidential and commercially useful
information in order to protect the business interests of its rightful
owner.'3 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 4 ("UTSA") of 1980
codified the various common law rules on trade secrets. Every state
has adopted laws, usually civil statutes, protecting trade secrets. 5 The
10. See id. The plaintiff did not present evidence that the agency used or intended to
use the information. Evidently the lawsuit was a precautionary measure. See id.
11. See id. at 1360. The defendant succeeded on a summary judgment because, even
when viewing the facts in favor of the plaintiff, the evidence indicated that the concept was
not a trade secret, that it was freely divulged by the plaintiff, and that the requisite
showing of imminent harm to enjoin the defendant was absent. See id.
12. Actually, the plaintiff's complaint, written pro se, demanded a "promissory note"
secured by a bond and did not mention the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act.
However, the court treated the action as one for an injunction under the Act because the
court declined to penalize the plaintiff for making an inadvertent procedural error. See id.
at 1359-60. For trade secrets resources on the Internet, see
<http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/>. See HARLEY HAHN, HARLEY HAHN'S INTERNET
& WEB YELLOW PAGES 451 (1999).
13. See, e.g., Joseph E. Root III & Guy M. Blynn, Abandonment of Common-Law
Principles: The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
823, 823 (1982) ("Trade secrets law seeks to protect a business person's interest in
information that is confidential and commercially valuable.").
14. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12, 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (1990). For a section-by-
section discussion of the UTSA and a summary of its concepts, see MICHAEL CRAIG
BUDDEN, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS UNDER THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT:
PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR EXECUTIVES 15-45 (1996).
15. This includes the District of Columbia. Seven states, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming, have only criminal statutes
defining trade secrets. The other states address trade secrets in civil statutes. See ALA.
CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (1) (1998 Supp.); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910 to -.945 (1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to -407 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (1996);
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3246.11 (West 1997 & 1999 Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-74-101 to -110 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1997 & 1999
Supp.); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 2001-2009(4) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-
501 to -510 (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001-.009 (West 1990 & 1999 Supp.);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1760 to -1767 (1994 & 1998 Supp.); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to
B-9 (1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807 (1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-1065/9
(1998 Supp.); IND. CODE §§ 24-2-3-1 to -3-8 (Michie 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1-.8
(West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 365.880-.900 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 51:1431-:1439 (West 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (1990);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 266, § 30(4) (1992 & 1999 Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.772
(MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.643(51)-(53) (1990)); MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1995); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450-.467 (West 1999); MONT.
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North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act16 ("NCTSPA" or "the
Act"), based largely on the UTSA, was enacted in July 1981 after
three years of planning. 7 Although the Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Committee of the North Carolina Bar Association initially
sought to adopt the entirety of the Uniform Act as it appeared in
1978, it later decided that the definition sections were overly lengthy
and complicated. 8 Consequently, the Committee drafted a simplified
bill that was introduced to the North Carolina General Assembly
during the 1981 session.' 9 Despite a debate regarding royalties20 that
led to the defeat of one portion of the bill,21 the submitted draft was
approved with only cosmetic changes.P
Since its inception, the NCTSPA has been the subject of very few
published decisions.23 This Comment will explore a number of
CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507 (1994); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010-.030 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-B:1-:9
(Michie 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1i (1995 & 1998 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-
3A-1 to -3A-7 (Michie Supp. 1995); (New York's law is not articulated in any one statute.);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (1997
Supp.); OHO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61-.69 (Page 1998 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
78, §§ 85-95 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3930 (Purdon 1983 & 1998 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (1992); S.C. CODE
STAT. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (1998); S.D. CODIED LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to -29-11 (Michie 1994
Revision); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-2 to -24-9 (Michie 1996); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-336 to -343
(Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90(1)(c) (West 1984); WYo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-501 to -505 (1997). Some of these statutes are not based on the UTSA.
16. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (1992). For a discussion of why states have
codified trade secrets law, see infra notes 401-13 and accompanying text.
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (Supp. 1981). The Act was to be effective
October 1 of the same year.
18. See Root & Blynn, supra note 13, at 831. The original source of this information
was the Committee's file, which included letters, drafts, and other papers, as well as
telephone interviews in 1981 with the sponsor of the bill, Hon. Marvin D. Musslewhite, Jr.
See id.
19. See id.
20. Royalties are compensation for the use of property, usually intellectual property
or natural resources, expressed as a percentage of receipts from using the property or as
an account per unit produced. See AMEDt E. TURNER, THE LAv OF TRADE SECRETS
428 (1962) (discussing royalties); see also BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1330-31 (6th ed.
1990) (defining royalties).
21. In the end, the Senate removed the limitation that the House Judiciary Committee
approved. See Root & Blynn, supra note 13, at 831. The debate addressed a scenario in
which a person who, in good faith, uses information given to him by another without
realizing that such information should have remained confidential as a trade secret. See id.
22. See id.
23. Of the published decisions mentioning the NCTSPA, only 10 have applied the Act
to fact patterns. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1456-62 (M.D.N.C. 1996);
Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1298-1305 (E.D.N.C. 1996); FMC
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possible explanations for the scarcity of NCTSPA case law. For
instance, the Act could be flawed in its structure, making attorneys
hesitant to rely on it. Another possible reason for the limited number
of judicial opinions involving the NCTSPA is that lawsuits based on
trade secrets are often pursued as a breach of a covenant not to
compete in the employment agreement. In addition to these reasons,
attorneys who use .the NCTSPA have offered other ideas to explain
its low visibility in the almost two decades since its effective date.24
First, perhaps the NCTSPA is used frequently, but there is little case
law because most cases are unpublished trial court injunctions and
temporary restraining orders that are rarely worth appealing.
Alternatively, litigating such claims may simply be undesirable since
customers are often called as witnesses at trial, and such cases are
therefore predisposed to settlement to avoid straining customer
relations. 5
Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1481-83 (W.D.N.C. 1995);
Quantum Health Resources v. Hemophilia Resources of America, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16726, at *30-36 (M.D.N.C.); Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, 802 F. Supp. 1358,
1359-60 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Moore v. American Barmag Corp., 710 F. Supp. 1050, 1058-61
(W.D.N.C. 1989); Mirafi, Inc. v. Murphy, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337, 1385-87 (W.D.N.C. 1989);
North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Econ. and
Community Dev., 108 N.C. App. 711, 718-19, 425 S.E.2d 440, 444-45 (1993); Barr-Mullin,
Inc. v. Browning, 108 N.C. App. 590, 594-99, 424 S.E.2d 226, 228-31 (1993); Drouillard v.
Keister Williams Newspaper Servs, 108 N.C. App. 169, 171-74, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326-27
(1992).
In fact, the NCTSPA has only been mentioned in four other opinions. See AG
Systems, Inc. v. United Decorative Plastics Corp., 55 F.3d 970, 972-3 (4th Cir. 1995);
Western Steer-Mom'N'Pop's, Inc. v. FMT Invs., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 260, 264 (W.D.N.C.
1984); Wilmington Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 125 N.C. App.
174, 179, 480 S.E.2d 53, 55-57 (1997); Wallace Computer Servs., Inc. v. Waite, 95 N.C.
App. 439, 439, 382 S.E.2d 846, 846 (1989). However, four North Carolina decisions that
do not specifically cite the NCTSPA are helpful trade secrets cases nonetheless. See
Consolidated Textiles, Inc. v. Sprague, 117 N.C. App. 132, 134,450 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1994)
(forbidding a former employee from using his ex-employer's customer list); S.E.T.A.
UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines, 107 N.C. App. 440, 446-47, 420 S.E.2d 674, 677-78 (1992)
(refusing trade secret protection to information about using animals in research projects);
United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 655-58, 370 S.E.2d 375, 383-85 (1988)
(finding trade secrets in customer information taken from a former place of employment);
Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 690-96, 228 S.E.2d 478, 482-86 (1976)
(protecting a modified method of manufacturing as a trade secret). Also, one unpublished
decision involves the NCTSPA. See In re Wilson, 165 F.3d 913, Nos. 97-1924, 97-1983, 97-
1315, 97-9183, 1998 WL 671658, at *2-5 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998).
24. Several top trade secrets attorneys in North Carolina contributed to this Comment
by offering experienced insight into why references to NCTSPA seldom appear in
published opinions. See infra notes 465-84.
25. Research is especially difficult because the NCTSPA has received very little
scholarly attention. With the exception of one law review article discussing the enactment
of the NCTSPA, see Root & Blynn, supra note 13, any North Carolina piece covering a
subject similar to trade secrets law does so in a context that completely neglects the
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This Comment attempts to test these theories through legal
NCTSPA. Although North Carolina scholars have addressed a wide range of topics
associated with trade secrets laws, none has discussed the NCTSPA specifically. See Tom
W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557,563 (1998); John M. Conley & Robert
M. Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63
N.C. L. REV. 563, 573-77 (1985); Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 89, 94-96, 102
(1993); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An
Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 233-35 (1998);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 497 (1995); Hamideh
Ramjerdi & Anthony D'Amato, The Intellectual Property Rights Laws of The People's
Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 169, 178-79 (1995); Pamela
Samuelson, Contu Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.. 663, 717-19; Kim Lane Scheppeie,
"It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1993, at 145-58; Elinor P. Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy
of Compensation for Occupational Disease, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at
164; David E. Shipley, Refusing to Rock the Boat. The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine
Applied to Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 385, 399 (1990);
David E. Shipley & Jeffrey S. Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common-Law
Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C. L. REV. 125, 153 (1984); William K. Slate,
II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 41, 51 (1996); Maury M. Tepper, III, Copyright Law: Integrating Successive Filtering
Into the Bifurcated Substantial Similarity Inquiry in Software Copyright Infringement
Cases: A Standard for Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Non-Literal
Elements of Computer Programs, 14 CAMPBELL L. Rv. 1, 10-12 (1991); Roy E. Thoman,
Book Review, Protecting Trade Secrets Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: Practical
Advice for Executives, N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 511, 551-52 (1996); Matias F.
Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features of a Foreign Investment Code
for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COMM. REG. 511,551-52 (1996);
Vance Franklin Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer
Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L.
REV. 977, 1007-09 (1988); Christopher Grafflin Browning, Jr., Comment, Intellectual
Property: The Souring of Sweet Acidophilus Milk. Speck v. North Carolina Dairy
Foundation and the Rights of University Faculty to Their Inventive Ideas, 63 N.C. L. REV.
1248, 1251-52 & n.25 (1985); Stephen M. Dorvee, Note, Protecting Trade Secrets Through
Copyright, 1981 DUKE L.I. 981, 982-86 (1981); Amy R. Edge, Comment, Preventing
Software Piracy Through Regional Trade Agreements: The Mexican Example, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 175, 182-84 (1994); Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Note, Aspiration and
Reality in Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore: An Introduction to the
Environmental Regulatory Systems of Asia's Four New Dragons, 4 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 125, 169 (1993); Lawrence J. Goode and Douglas R. Willams, Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1985, 1986 DUKE L.J. 384, 394-95;
Steven J. Lepper, Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1982, 1983
DUKE L.I. 390, 391; Elizabeth Miller, Note, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Secret
Licensing: A Legal Review and Economic Analysis, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1989, at 184-90; John Reid Parker, Jr., Note, Injunctive Russian Roulette and Employment
Noncompetition Cases: A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure, 63 N.C. L. REv. 222, 228-30
(1984); John L. Spilsbury, Note, The Hazardous Chemicals Right-to-Know Act: Letting the
Public Know What's Next Door, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1330, 1337,1341-47 (1986).
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research and investigation.26  The logic of this Comment's
investigation is simple. It begins with two observations: first, that the
NCTSPA seldom appears in published judicial opinions; and second,
that its statutory language departs from the language of the UTSA.
In light of these two observations, the Comment first queries whether
the NCTSPA is somehow flawed and therefore of little practical use
to North Carolina businesses. To evaluate this possibility, this
Comment uses a two-pronged test: First, Section II of this Comment
contrasts the specific language of the NCTSPA with that of the
UTSA and trade secrets acts of other states;z7 next, Section III
compares North Carolina's trade secrets case law with case law in
other states.' In the findings, Section II concludes that, despite two
significant distinctions, the NCTSPA is not fundamentally different
from other trade secrets acts,29 and Section III confirms that North
Carolina's case law parallels the law of almost every other state.30
This strongly suggests that the NCTSPA is not flawed, assuming that
trade secrets law in general is a sound construct.
Satisfied that the NCTSPA appears well grounded, this
Comment returns to the preliminary observation that the Act rarely
appears in published opinions and asks whether most trade secrets
cases are being framed as claims for breach of non-competition
agreements rather than as violations of the NCTSPA. To test this
notion, Section IV of the Comment explores the use of non-
competition covenants in North Carolina as an alternative legal
solution to litigating under the NCTSPA.31 In doing so, the Comment
compares the principles of trade secret law with those of covenants
not to compete and then explores case law on the covenants,
concluding that the NCTSPA probably is overshadowed by cases on
employment contracts.3 2 In search of additional support for this
conclusion, Section V of this Comment reports the views of several
experienced trade secrets attorneys in North Carolina, who supply
valuable insight into the reasons for the NCTSPA's low visibility in
published law. For the most part, the attorneys agreed that litigating
non-competition covenants typically is preferred over suing under the
26. For an examination of whether the NCTSPA is flawed, see infra notes 35-398 and
accompanying text. For an investigation of whether trade secrets claims are more likely to
be couched as contract actions, see infra notes 399-464 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 35-120 and accompanying text.
2& See infra notes 121-398 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 35-120 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 121-398 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 399-464 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 399-464 and accompanying text.
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Act.3 3 Section VI concludes that, despite the reluctance of practicing
attorneys to litigate claims under the NCTSPA, it is effective
legislation nonetheless.'
II. THE NCTSPA CONTRASTED WITH THE UTSA AND TRADE
SECRETS ACTS OF OTHER STATES
In the North Carolina General Statutes, Article 24 of Chapter 66
on business commerce is the "Trade Secrets Protection Act. ' 35 It is
comprised of six sections and reserves another five for future
developments.3 6 The six sections individually address the definitions,
the nature of the action, the remedies available, the applicable burden
of proof, the appropriate court measures to preserve secrecy, and the
statute of limitations. 7
A close comparison of definitions may reveal a flaw in the
NCTSPA because statutory definitions are critical to trade secrets
cases. The term "misappropriation" appears first in the NCTSPA,
and of the forty-two states that have trade secrets statutes in their
general civil statutes, every state except North Carolina has adopted
the UTSA definition of misappropriation, usually with slight semantic
or stylistic alterations3 In the NCTSPA, "misappropriation" is
defined as the acquisition, disclosure, or use of another's trade secret
without express or implied authority or consent, unless the trade
secret was obtained by independent development, reverse
engineering, or from someone who had a right to disclose the trade
secret.39 The UTSA definition is different because it focuses on
improper motive.4 The definition explains misappropriation in two
ways: (1) the acquisition of someone's trade secret by one who knew
or had reason to know it was improperly acquired; and (2) disclosure
by parties who have neither consent nor authority to make such
33. See infra notes 465-84 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 485-87 and accompanying text.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (1992).
36. See §§ 66-158 to -162.
37. See §§ 66-152 to -157.
38. See supra note 15 (listing the civil trade secrets acts in the United States). The
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Committee of the North Carolina Bar Associations
rejected the UTSA definitions written by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
Root & Blynn, supra note 13, at 833. Regarding "misappropriation," the Committee felt
that arguing to a jury against any violation of, for example, section 1(2)(ii)(B)(I) would be
confusing. See id.
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(1).
40. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
1999] 2155
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disclosure.4' No component of the North Carolina definition requires
improper intent on the part of the misappropriator.42 Because the
NCTSPA does not include improper motive in its definition of
misappropriation, the UTSA's definition of "improper means" is
absent in the NCTSPA as well.43 The UTSA defines "improper
means" as including "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means." 44 The definition of improper
means is significant in delineating what acts constitute the requisite
fault upon which liability is based.
North Carolina is the only state of the forty-two with a civil trade
secrets statute that does not include this language, 45 and, in rare
circumstances, North Carolina's unique definition of
"misappropriation" could make the outcome of a trade secrets case in
North Carolina different from the outcome of a similar case in other
states.46 To illustrate, suppose hypothetically that a physicist creates a
self-watering flower pot and that a flower pot manufacturer knows
the physicist has developed such technology. When the corporation
41. See § 1(2)(i), (ii). The second definition is slightly more complex in that it
presents three alternative scenarios focusing on disclosure rather than acquisition of trade
secrets. See § 1(2)(ii). The first scenario is the non-consensual disclosure or use of
another's trade secret. See § 1(2)(ii)(A). The second misappropriation scenario is the
non-consensual disclosure or use of another's trade secret by one who, at the time of
disclosure or use, should have known: (1) that his knowledge of it was improperly
acquired by someone else; (2) that he acquired the trade secret under circumstances
triggering a duty to keep it a secret or limit its use; or (3) that he owed a duty of secrecy.
See § 1(2)(ii)(B)(I), (IIM). The final misappropriation scenario is the non-consensual
disclosure of another's trade secret by one who, before a material change in his position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that he learned it either by
accident or mistake. See § 1(2)(ii)(C).
42. However, intent is relevant for determining what remedies may be granted when a
party receives misappropriated information in good faith. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-
154(a)(2) (1992).
43. See id. at § 66-152.
44. § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. at 437. In contrast, Alabama accepts the UTSA's examples of
theft, bribery, and misrepresentation, but then adds to this definition "inducement of a
breach of confidence," "trespass," and "[o]ther deliberate acts taken for the specific
purpose of gaining access to the information of another by means such as electronic,
photographic, telescopic or other aids to enhance normal human perception, where the
trade secret owner reasonably should be able to expect privacy." ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(2)
(1993).
45. See supra note 15; ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(2) (1993).
46. See Root & Blynn, supra note 13, at 834-35. For a case in which North Carolina
courts might have reached the opposite result, see Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d
400, 405-06 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the circuit court reversed a trial court based on the
absence of "improper means" in obtaining information. The hypothetical scenario that
follows in the text is adapted from the Root & Blynn article. See Root & Blynn, supra
note 13, at 835.
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offers to purchase the physicist's idea, she refuses, saying that she
intends to enhance her profits by keeping the self-watering
innovation confidential. The physicist's former lab assistant, having a
spare key to the physicist's laboratory, enters and copies all the
secrets about how pots can water themselves. The assistant then
approaches the flower pot corporation and convinces its executives
that he has invented a self-watering pot through his own independent
development. If the corporation pays for the information and uses it,
it would not be liable for misappropriation under the UTSA because
it lacked the knowledge or reason to know that the assistant used
improper means to obtain the information.4 7 By contrast, under the
NCTSPA the physicist would have prima facie evidence to establish a
case against the corporation because the corporation knew the self-
watering process was a trade secret and used it without consent.
48
Since "improper means" is not an element of "misappropriation" in
North Carolina, the corporation would be liable even if it proved in
court that it obtained the trade secret in good faith.49 The corporation
would lose the case because as a matter of law the former lab assistant
had no right to disclose the secret. As the above example illustrates,
a North Carolina trade secrets case could come out differently from
an identical case in another state but only where such a rare fact
pattern arises.5 0
"Trade secret," the final term defined by the NCTSPA, is
business or technical information including, but not limited to,
formulae, patterns, programs, devices, compilations of information,
methods, techniques, or processes.5 1 This information must derive its
47. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. at 438.
48, See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-155 (1992).
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. Common sense dictates that a party knowing it has another person's trade secret
will also have exercised some type of improper motive in obtaining it.
51. See § 66-152(3). Because the definition requires that the information be "business
or technical" and have "commercial value," one could argue that artistic or charitable
concepts are not afforded protection. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW, TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 681 (1997) [hereinafter ABA
SuRVEY]. The NCTSPA and UTSA also differ in their definition of "[p]erson." The
NCTSPA defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, or any other
legal or commercial entity." See § 66-152(2). The UTSA definition is nearly identical
except that it uses "natural person" rather than "individual" and lists the other entities in a
different order. See UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(3), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). Of the
forty-two states with a civil trade secrets protection act, Wisconsin is alone in opting not to
define "person." See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (1) (West 1989). However, section 990.01
(26) of the Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, titled "Construction and Effect of Acts and
Statutes," defines "person" by terms that appear in the UTSA definition. See WIS. STAT.
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actual or potential commercial value because it is not generally
known or readily ascertainable through independent development or
reverse engineering by those who can profit from it 2 Additionally,
the material must be reasonably secretive.53 The corresponding
language in UTSA is substantially similar. The noticeable differences
are that the UTSA requires the information to be unavailable "by
proper means" and that the UTSA mentions neither independent
development nor reverse engineering. 4 Perhaps the only implication
of this difference is that the NCTSPA definition may be considered
broader by its inclusion of "but not limited to" preceding its list of
examples of trade secrets.55
Other states have added to their definition of "trade secrets" by
naming tangible or specific objects.5 6 For example, Colorado and
ANN. § 990.01(26) (1992). Assuming "individual" and "natural person" are synonymous
terms, the difference between the NCTSPA and UTSA definitions of "person" is probably
cosmetic. Research reveals no implication that "individual" introduces anything more or
less to the NCTPA construction than what would be covered by the term "natural person"
in the UTSA.
52. See § 66-152(3)(a). Nevada substituted the words "present or potential" for the
UTSA's "actual or potential" economic value. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 600A.030(4)(a) (Michie 1994).
53. See § 66-152(3)(b).
54. See UNIT. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). The NCTSPA also
adds "of information" after "compilation," which adds clarity but not substance. See § 66-
152(3).
55. See § 66-152(3). Presumably, Missouri attempted a similar objective in adding
"including but not limited to" before its examples and including a reference to "technical
or nontechnical data." See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.453(4) (West 1999).
56. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.940(3) (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-401(4) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 48-501(4) (Michie 1996);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(4) (1985); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-102(4) (West 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51(d) (West 1996); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. § 2001(4) (1982); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 48-501(4) (Michie 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 688.002(4) (1988); GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-761(4) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482B-2 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 48-801(5)
(1990); 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 1065/2(d) (West 1993); IND. CODE § 24-2-3-2 (1995); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320(4) (1988); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 365.880(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1431(4) (West
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1542(4) (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN. § 11-1201(e)
(1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 266, § 30(4); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 752.772 (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.643 (52)); MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01 Subd. 5 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-26-
3(d) (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.453(4) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-402(4)
(1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-502(4) (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.030(4) (1993); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-B:1(IV) (Michie 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:20-1i (1992); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-3A-2(D) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW, art. 6 (1988)
and N.Y. ST. ENVIR. FAciLrrEs CORP. Acr, Pub. Auths. Law § 1280 (1990); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 66-152(3) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-25.1-01(4) (1983); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1333.61(D) (Baldwin 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 86(4) (1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646.461(4) (1995); 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West Cum. Ann. Pocket Part 1997);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-41-1(D) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-1(4) (Law. Co-op. 1994); S.D.
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Ohio include "listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers."'57
The Oregon statute includes drawings, cost data, and customer lists.58
Idaho specifically includes computer programs to the UTSA
definition,59 as do Montana and North Dakota.0 Naming specific
items in a statute removes uncertainty when determining what is
included under the general heading of "business or technical
information" in the UTSA. This is due, in part, to the fact that
"formulae, patterns, programs" and such are written as a subset of
that heading, not as alternatives in themselves. Therefore, in North
Carolina a court may have some difficulty deciding whether, for
instance, secrets about a prominent businessperson's personal life
that are sold to a newspaper may be a trade secret. The information
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-1(4) (Michie 1994 Revision); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138
(Michie Repl. Vol. 1991); "rEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-24-2(4) (1989); VA. CODE § 59.1-336(4) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010(4)
(West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 47-22-1(d) (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90(1)(c) (West
1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-501(a)(xi) (1995). Some of these statutes are not based on
the UTSA.
57. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-102(4) (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1333.61(D) (Page 1998 Supp.). Colorado, Ohio, and Alabama are the only states that
have made substantive changes to the UTSA's language in this section. ALA. CODE § 8-
27-2 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-102(4) (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1333.61(D) (Page 1998 Supp.). Alabama uses the terms "computer software, drawing,
[and] device," among others. § 8-27-2. Some less substantive changes have been made in
other states, such as Kentucky and Nebraska. Kentucky's trade secrets act includes "data"
in its list, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.880(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1996), and Nebraska's
includes drawings and codes, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-502(4) (1994). Note, however,
that where lists are not exhaustive, the legal distinction between statutes containing them
is diminished. The more descriptive definitions simply aid in guiding the courts.
58. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461(4) (1997). The Oregon legislature also removed
the UTSA's requirement that trade secrets not be readily ascertainable by proper means.
See id. California did the same. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 1997).
Customer lists are indicated in Georgia's act as well as Oregon's. Georgia
specifies that financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual or potential
customers or suppliers that the public does not commonly know, are trade secrets. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761 (4) (1998 Supp.); see also 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 1065/2 (d)
(West 1993) (offering trade secret protection to a "drawing, process, financial data, or list
of actual or potential customers or suppliers"). The Georgia legislature's strict wording
regarding customer lists expresses that customer information that is personally known by
employees might not qualify as a trade secret. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 219.
However, the Georgia definition arguably is broader than the UTSA because it stipulates
that trade secrets include information "without regard to form." § 10-1-761(4).
59. See IDAHO CODE § 48-801(5) (1997). That section continues with an addendum
providing that Idaho's trade secrets are subject to disclosure by a public agency according
to the Open Public Records Law. See id.
60. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-402(4) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-
18.4(2)(a) (1993 & 1997 Supp.). North Dakota's statute specifically provides that a
"computer software program and components of a computer software program which are
subject to a copyright or patent" fit within the definition of "trade secret." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-25.1-01 (1997 Supp.).
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may be commercially valuable, but it is not clear under either the
NCTSPA or the UTSA whether it is "business or technical
information."
The NCTSPA concludes its definitional section with the
following sentence: "The existence of a trade secret shall not be
negated merely because the information comprising the trade secret
has also been developed, used, or owned independently by more than
one person, or licensed to other persons."'6' This proviso parallels in
some ways the Commissioners' Comment that follows the UTSA's
definitions, which explains that trade secrets need not be exclusive to
confer a competitive advantage.62  That is to say, separate
corporations may acquire rights in the same trade secret.63 As the
notion of dual trade secret ownership is recognized by both the
NCTSPA and UTSA, the statutes should operate the same when a
relevant situation arises. Under either scheme, for example, a
defendant could not escape liability by proving only that another
person had the plaintiff's trade secret.
The second section of the NCTSPA is the "engine" of the Act. It
grants any trade-secret owner a civil remedy for the misappropriation
of her trade secret.64 The UTSA has no similar separate provision,
relying instead on sections that address injunctive relief and damages
to provide a remedy for misappropriation. 65 No state other than
North Carolina has designed its act so that the definitions are
followed by a single section providing relief for the person wronged
under the statute.66 The placement of a single section providing relief,
however, should not impact the way the statute operates. A plaintiff
would have an opportunity to recover equally under this section of
the NCTSPA or under the parts of the UTSA that describe remedies.
The next section of the NCTSPA expands on remedies.67
Subsection (a) declares that actual or threatened misappropriation
may be preliminarily enjoined during the pendency of the. action and
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 (1992). Only the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secrets
Act supplements its trade secrets definition with a complete disclaimer like North
Carolina's. See MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 Subd.(5) (1995). The Minnesota Act provides that
even if an employee or someone else has acquired sensitive information without express
or specific notice that it is a trade secret, the information may still qualify if, under all the
circumstances, the acquirer knows or has reason to know that the owner intends or
expects the secrecy at issue to be maintained. See idL
62. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs Acr § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 439 (commissioners' comment).
63. See id.
64. See § 66-153.
65. See § 2,3, 14 U.L.A. at 449,455-56.
66. See supra note 15 (listing the civil trade secrets acts in the United States).
67. See § 66-154.
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shall be permanently enjoined following a judgment against the
misappropriating individual.61 The permanent injunction will persist
for the time that the trade secret exists and longer if the judge deems
an extension is necessary to preclude the misappropriating person
from benefiting unjustly from his misdeed.69 Subpart (1) states,
however, that if the court finds -that a permanent injunction is
unreasonable, an injunction may be conditional upon payment of a
reasonable royalty for any reasonable period. 0 This subpart also
authorizes judges to compel affirmative acts by court order if such
acts would be sensible in particular cases.7 Subpart (2) instructs that
acquirers of a trade secret--even those who act in good faith-shall
be enjoined from disclosing it.' However, no damages can be
assessed against anyone for misappropriation if she learns the
information before she could have reasonably known that it was, in
fact, a trade secret.73 Although the Act does not provide for damages
in such cases, good-faith acquirers who have substantially relied on a
trade secret may be ordered to pay a reasonable royalty for its use
rather than be permanently enjoined.74 The good-faith acquirer may
dispose of any inventory amassed through knowing or using the trade
secret without penalty. If that person's use of the trade secret does
not harm the original owner's economic standing, then the acquirer
can only be enjoined from disclosing the trade secret and cannot be
penalized any further.75
Subsection (b) provides that, in addition to any relief granted in
the previous subsection on injunctions, actual damages are
recoverable.76 Actual damages are the greater of either the economic
loss or the unjust enrichment resulting from the misappropriation of
the trade secret.77 Subsection (c) allows for punitive damages where
the misappropriation is willful and malicious.78 Finally, subsection (d)
authorizes the court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party if it finds either that willful and malicious
68. See § 66-154(a). That statement is qualified by "except as provided herein"
because exceptions immediately follow. Id.
69. See id.
70. See § 66-154(a)(1).
71. See id.
72. See § 66-154(a)(2).
73. See id.
74. See id The court determines what qualifies as just payment. See id.
75. See id.
76. See § 66-154(b).
77. See id.
78. See § 66-154(c). Discretion to award punitive damages rests with the trier of fact.
See id.
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appropriation occurred or that a claim of misappropriation was made
in bad faith. 9
The NCTSPA and UTSA share many similarities with regard to
providing remedies.8 Among the dissimilarities, however, is the fact
that the UTSA restrains judicial discretion slightly more than the
North Carolina Act. The NCTSPA and UTSA also contain some
significant differences regarding remedies. An injunction under the
UTSA may be extended after a trade secret ceases to exist only if the
advantage obtained by use of the trade secret is commercial. 1 The
NCTSPA, in contrast, allows extension for any "inequitable or
unjust" benefit. 82 Furthermore, the UTSA limits the payment of
royalties in a conditional injunction to the period of time that the
trade secret's use could have been prohibited and allows conditional
injunctions only for "exceptional circumstances."'83 In contrast, the
NCTSPA permits conditional injunctions for "any period the court
may deem just."'  The UTSA also caps punitive damages at an
amount double that of the non-punitive monetary award, while the
NCTSPA's punitive damages provision is limitless-although all
claims for punitive damages in North Carolina are limited under a
separate chapter.85 Finally, unlike the NCTSPA, the UTSA grants
attorney's fees if a motion to terminate an injunction is made or
resisted in bad faith. 6 This comparison demonstrates that none of
those differences is substantial enough to indicate any flawed policy
79. See § 66-154(d).
80. Both laws authorize a court to compel affirmative acts to protect the trade secret
in appropriate circumstances, to grant attorneys' fees if misappropriation is malicious or
litigation is commenced in bad faith, and to allow the complainant recovery of actual
damages or unjust enrichment in addition to injunctive relief. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
Act §§ 3-4, 14 U.L.A. 455-56, 459 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154(c). In fact, UTSA
says money damages may be taken in addition to or "in lieu of" injunctive relief, but
presumably under the NCTSPA a plaintiff could not recover damages without an
injunction of some kind. See id.
81. See § 2,14 U.L.A. at 449.
82. § 66-154(a).
83. See § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. at 449. The UTSA defines exceptional circumstances to
include a situation in which the defendant has made a material and prejudicial change of
position before she knew or had reason to know of misappropriation that renders a
prohibitive injunction inequitable. See § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. at 449. Indiana's trade secrets act
states that such circumstances might include the plaintiffs inability to prove damages or
unjust enrichment. See IND. CODE § 24-2-34(b) (1995).
84. § 66-154(a)(1). The NCTSPA does not refer to "exceptional circumstances." See
§ 66-154(a).
85. See § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. at 456; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154(c); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § ID-10 (1997) (stating that any claim for punitive damages will be limited
regardless of any law to the contrary).
86. See § 4(ii), 14 U.L.A. at 459; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154(d).
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underlying the NCrSPA, especially when recognizing that other
states have added similar flexibility to their trade secrets acts.
Although most states generally adopt the UTSA approach to the
issues of injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees, there are
some variations. With regard to injunctive relief, four states in
addition to North Carolina omit the UTSA's preface that conditional
injunctions are reserved for "exceptional circumstances."'  For
example, Georgia adds a subsection declaring that a contract is not
required to enjoin a person who misappropriates a trade secret."
Oregon's trade secrets act is also more flexible in permitting
injunctions; it states that actual or threatened misappropriation may
be "temporarily, preliminarily or permanently enjoined." 9
The damages issue is also treated in different ways by some
states. Alaska and California omit the UTSA's exemption from
damages where a defendant who has made a material or prejudicial
change of position before learning or having a reason to know of
misappropriation in a way that would render monetary recovery
inequitable.90 Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska do not expressly
permit punitive damages in their trade secrets acts.91 Mississippi and
Missouri removed the cap on punitive damages altogether,92 whereas
Alabama, Ohio, and Virginia have established caps that allow larger
awards than does the UTSA.93  Several states have damages
87. See § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. at 449; ALA. CODE § 8-27-4 (1993); ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.50.910(b) (1998); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.2(b) (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-74-103 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-52(b) (1997).
88. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-762(d) (1994).
89. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.463(1) (1995). In Wisconsin, a complainant must
include a detailed, written description of the trade secret that he or she seeks to enjoin or
restrain. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90(3)(a)(1) (West 1989).
90. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.915(a) (1998); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(a) (West
1997).
91. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-606 (1996); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1433 (1987); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 87-504 (1994)" In fact, Nebraska opted to adopt neither the damages nor the
attorney's fees sections of the UTSA. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-504 (1994).
92. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-26-7(2) (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.457(2) (West
1999). Missouri allows punitive damages "[i]f misappropriation is outrageous because of
the misappropriator's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others." Mo.
REV. ANN. § 417.457(2) (West 1997). Oregon places a cap on the amount of damages
available of two times the amount of total damages, but makes punitive damages easier to
prove by its substitution of the JTSA's "willful and malicious" precondition with "willful
or malicious." OR. REV. STAT. § 646.465(3) (1997) (emphasis added).
93. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(3) (1993) (limiting exemplary damages to the greater of
$5000 or the non-punitive amount recovered); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.63(B)
(1996) (limiting punitive or exemplary damages to three times any other award
recovered); VA. CODE § 59.1-338(B) (1990) (limiting punitive damages to the lesser of
$350,000 or twice the money damages awarded).
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provisions expressing that where damages and unjust enrichment
have not been proven, or in lieu of such proof, the court may award
damages based on a reasonable 1royalty for the misappropriating
individual's unauthorized disclosure or use. The reasonable royalty is
restricted in some states to the period of time that the use could have
been forbidden as trade secret misappropriation.94
Most states adopted the UTSA's section addressing attorneys'
fees.95 Alaska, Idaho, Missouri, and Nebraska, however, did not.96
Two states made slight modifications: Iowa's trade secrets act affords
a prevailing party "actual and reasonable" attorneys' fees,97 and
Oregon allows attorneys' fees if the misappropriation was willful "or"
malicious, abandoning the UTSA's conjunctive form.98
A section establishing the burden of proof for recovery under the
Act follows the remedies section in the NCTSPA.99 According to this
section, a prima facie case for misappropriation of a trade secret is
assumed when substantial evidence shows that the defendant knows
or should have known that the information at issue is a trade secret
and has acquired, disclosed, or used it-or had a specific opportunity
to do so-without the owner's express or implied consent or
authority.100 The prima facie evidence can be rebutted by a showing
of substantial evidence that the defendant acquired the information
comprising the trade secret by independent development, reverse
engineering, or from someone who rightfully disclosed it to the
defendant.1 1 This section concludes by advising that defendants in
trade secrets cases are entitled to other legal defenses as well.102 Since
neither the UTSA drafters nor any other state inserted provisions
addressing a burden of proof,"° the NCTSPA's prima facie
94. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West 1997) (limiting royalty payments to a
duration no longer than use of the secret could be prohibited); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
763(a) (1994) (limiting damages in terms of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the use
could have been prohibited). Ohio's provision explains that such alternative proof shall
consider "the loss to the complainant, the benefit to the misappropriator, or both." OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1333.63(A) (1996).
95. See supra note 15 (listing the state trade secrets acts).
96. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-.945 (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807
(1997); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450-.467 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507
(1994).
97. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.6 (West 1997).
98. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.647(3) (1997).




103. See supra note 15 (listing the civil trade secrets acts); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§§ 1-12, 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (1990).
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requirement and affirmative defenses could be read as an effort to
counterbalance its broad definition of "misappropriation."'
1 4
The next section in the NCTSPA is entitled "Preservation of
Secrecy.""0 It states that a court shall protect an alleged trade secret
by means that may include granting protective orders for discovery
proceedings, holding in camera hearings, sealing records of the action
subject to further court order, and ordering anyone who learns the
alleged trade secret during the litigation not to divulge it without
court approval.1 6 The UTSA's corresponding section is almost
identical, except that it does not include the words "subject to further
court order" in describing the sealing of records." Nebraska is the
only state that materially departs from the UTSA's version of this
section;"0 8 however, Alabama did not adopt the UTSA's section at all
and does not substitute one of its own.' 9
A statute of limitations statement is the final section of the
NCTSPA."0 It gives plaintiffs three years to commence an action
under the Act, beginning when the alleged misappropriation is, or
reasonably should have been, discovered."' However, the NCTSPA
omits a provision included in the UTSA that requires the exercise of
reasonable diligence to discover the misappropriation by the
plaintiff.12  The UTSA, unlike the NCTSPA, also stipulates that a
continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim." Every state
with a civil trade secrets act includes a statute of limitations," 4 and
only six deviate from the three year allowance in the UTSA."5
Despite some minor variations, the NCTSPA is not
fundamentally different from the UTSA and other states' trade secret
104. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 680.
105. See § 66-156.
106. See id.
107. See UNEF. TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 5,14 U.L.A. 461 (1990).
10& See NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-505 (1994) (specifying that parties' attorneys, witnesses
and experts must not disclose the alleged trade secret, and adding that disclosure or
publication of a trade secret in or resulting from a court proceeding will not constitute an
abandonment of the secret).
109. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-2 to -6 (1993).
110. See § 66-157.
111. See id.
112. See UNIF. TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 6,14 U.L.A. at 462.
113. See id. (including a section not contained in the NCTSPA).
114. See supra note 15 (listing the civil trade secrets acts).
115. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-5 (1993) (allowing two years); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
1065/7 (West 1993) (allowing five years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1547 (1997)
(allowing four years); MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.461 (West 1999) (allowing five years); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 87-506 (1994) (allowing four years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.66 (Page
1998 Supp.) (allowing four years).
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acts."6 The major distinctions in the NCTSPA-the absence of a bad
faith requirement and the inclusion of a burden of proof section-
should offset each other in terms of ease of making a claim under the
statute."7 A claim may be easier to establish under the NCTSPA
because a plaintiff need not show that the defendant knew of the
impropriety of the trade secret acquisition.' That same claim may
be more difficult, however, in that the plaintiff's burden is clearly
defined: to prove that the defendant at least should have known that
he or she had an opportunity to, or did in fact, acquire or use a trade
secret without consent." 9 Thus, a trade secrets plaintiff in North
Carolina would be advantaged over a UTSA plaintiff in not having to
prove improper motive, yet disadvantaged in having to satisfy a
clearly defined burden of proof that is absent in the UTSA."0
Considered in its totality from a practitioner's standpoint, it appears
that maintaining a claim under the NCTSPA is not much easier or
more difficult than it would be under the UTSA or most other states'
trade secrets acts.
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S TRADE SECRETS CASE LAW CONTRASTED
WITH CASE LAW IN OTHER STATES
Most trade secrets cases in North Carolina are not tremendously
informative standing alone, but taken together they offer some insight
into how North Carolina courts compare with other state courts in
treating certain issues. This Section will first discuss how courts
define "trade secrets."' 2  Next, this Section will present cases
expounding. on how misappropriation is proven or defeated.'2 In
addition, this Section will analyze the specific types of information
that are protected or refused protection in state courts."2 Finally, it
116. Incidentally, the NCTSPA does exclude five sections that appear in the UTSA.
These sections of the UTSA are titled "Effect on Other Law," "Uniformity of Application
and Construction," "Short Title," "Severability" and "Time of Taking Effect." See UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 7-11, 14 U.L.A. 463-66 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to
-157 (1992). They are, however, the most likely sections to be stricken or rewritten by the
states, so they are not central to the purpose of the UTSA. See supra note 15 (listing the
civil trade secrets acts).
117. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 680.
118. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
120. A plaintiff under the NCTSPA may also obtain a better remedy. See supra notes
67-86 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 125-54 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 155-91 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 192-357 and accompanying text.
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will explore the type of relief that states grant.124
A. "Trade Secrets"
Two North Carolina cases shed light on the meaning of the
statutory definition of "trade secrets." In Amariglio-Dunn v. McCoy,
the court relied on the statutory definition to describe a trade secret
as valuable business or technical information that (a) is neither
"generally known nor readily ascertainable through independent
development or reverse engineering" and (b) has been subject to
"efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy."'12 In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment,
the court held that a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to allow a
reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the information at issue
satisfies both requirements. 26
The Fourth Circuit interpreted "trade secrets" again in Glaxo,
Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd 27  In that case, Glaxo claimed that
Novopharm sought permission to manufacture and market anti-ulcer
tablets containing a mixture of two forms of a chemical, one of which.
was patented by Glaxo."28 In addition, Glaxo accused Novopharm of
violating the NCTSPA by disobeying a protective order in an effort to
develop the manufacturing process for its new product.1 29 The court
explained that a tension arises when trade secret protection is
asserted for the only known method of practicing a patented
invention. 30  The court noted that a trade secret is generally not
known to the public, while a patent demands disclosure of the best
way to operate the invention. 3' The court, therefore, reasoned that
any time an invention qualifies as a trade secret, the inventor has not
disclosed the idea sufficiently to obtain a patent.132 Conversely,
according to the court, the owner of a valid patent will have disclosed
124. See infra notes 358-98 and accompanying text.
125. Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, 802 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 1992), affd sub
nom. Amariglio-Dunn v. McCoy, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 1-12 and
accompanying text (discussing McCoy).
126. See id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986)); 10A CHARLES ALAN ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2727
(1995).
127. 931 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1996), afJ'd, 110 F.3d 1562 (4th Cir. 1997).
128. See id. at 1284.
129. See id. The protective order prohibited the use of certain proprietary information
owned by Glaxo. See id. Novopharm counterclaimed that Glaxo was attempting to
monopolize the market for the chemical in question. See id.
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the best method for practicing the invention, effectively destroying
trade secret protection, unless he later develops some unanticipated
alternative practice." Thus, the court concluded that only in an
unusual circumstance could Glaxo sue under trade secret law and sue
on its patent as well."3 In explaining why Glaxo had not proven a
trade secret, the court set out the NCTSPA definition and determined
that
[a] trade secret need not necessarily be comprised of
positive information, such as a specific formula, but can
include negative, inconclusive, or sufficiently suggestive
research data that would give a person skilled in the art a
competitive advantage he might not otherwise enjoy but for
the knowledge gleaned from the owner's research
investment. 5
The court then inquired into the merit of Glaxo's trade secrets claim
by identifying the nature of the alleged secret without further
expanding on the definition of trade secret as a general legal term.3 6
As in North Carolina, judicial interpretation of the "trade
secrets" definition is generally sparse across the United States. In
fact, eighteen states have not interpreted the definition in their civil
trade secrets acts at all,'37 and Wyoming has not interpreted its
criminal statutory definition. 8 A few other states, including North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island, have only one or two cases
that expand on the definition in their state acts.'39 Several states have
relied heavily on either common law 4° or the Restatement of Torts
141
to decide their trade secret cases, while others have simply
interpreted the language embodied in their state trade secrets acts. 42
133. See id.-
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1299.
136. See id.
137. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 8, 22, 49, 191, 241, 256, 371, 408, 465, 523,
539, 553, 627, 714, 814, 868, 878, 933. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and West
Virginia. See id
138. See id. at 976.
139. See, e.g., id. at 696,733,795 (reviewing the cases).
140. For instance, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming have based their decisions on common law. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51,
at 142, 271, 493, 640-41, 772, 976.
141. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Examples are Michigan, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 465,604,772, 849.
142. Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Virginia, and Washington are some. See ABA
SURVEY, supra note 51, at 50,161,314,888-89, 912.
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The nine states with the most concrete judicial interpretations of
their trade secrets definitions are California, Colorado, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. 43
In California, trade secret information is not -protected where it has
been confidential by mere chance; in other words, the holder must
have taken affirmative steps to prevent its disclosure.'" Colorado's
court of appeals listed factors to assist in the determination of a trade
secret, including the extent to which the information is known to
those outside and inside a business, the amount of effort or money
spent in obtaining or developing the secret, and the time and expense
others would endure in order to acquire or duplicate the information
themselves.145 To sort out the notion of a trade secret, most cases in
Georgia address the distinction between customer lists taken from an
employer and customer information known personally to a former
employee; a list written from memory after the employee left might
be useable, whereas a list written at work on the day before leaving
would have to be returned.46
To determine whether or not a trade secret was readily
ascertainable, Indiana once used an "economic infeasibility" standard
by which a trade secret could be proven if others' duplication of the
information would be economically infeasible.'4 That standard later
was overturned in favor of a test that measures time invested,
expense, and effort needed to duplicate or acquire the alleged trade
secret.'" The Iowa Supreme Court broadly interprets trade secrets to
143. See id. at 78,115,224, 314, 332,424, 827, 888, 912.
144. See Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 50, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602, 611 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992). Also, for information to satisfy the "independent economic value" element of the
state trade secrets definition, which requires a trade secret to hold such value, the
information must provide a "competitive advantage" to its owner. See Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076,1090-91 (9th Cir. 1986).
145. See Network Telecommunications, Inc. v. Boor-Crepeau, 790 P.2d 901, 903 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1990) (citing Porter Indus., Inc v. Higgins, 680 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984), a case that preceded the passage of Colorado's trade secrets act); see also Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1526-27 (D. Colo. 1995) (using the
Porter Industries test to conclude that religious works which were "widely known outside
the Church" were not trade secrets, for lack of secrecy).
146. See, e.g., Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 437 S.E.2d 302, 303 (Ga. 1993) (holding
that lists containing information about customers of distributors were trade secrets); Smith
v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 789, 790 (Ga. 1991) (holding that a nurse-placement
agency's customer lists were not trade secrets); American Bldgs. Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys.,
392 S.E.2d 860, 864 (Ga. 1990) (disallowing an injunction to keep a competitor from
soliciting, inducing, or recruiting a manufacturer's employees to change jobs).
147. See Xpert Automation Sys. Corp. v. Vibromatic Co., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 351, 355-60
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
148. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993). The Amoco court
continued that a trade secret can be composed of individual non-secrets because the
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include virtually any category of information,'49 including recipes for
sandwiches, pizza sauce, and crust.5 ' In Maryland, the most
important factors for finding a trade secret are secrecy, novelty, and
value to the company.'
South Dakota does not permit "general dissemination" if
knowledge is to qualify as a trade secret, but releasing certain
confidential and proprietary knowledge to member cooperatives does
not negate trade secret status. 5 2 Virginia law also allows disclosure of
trade secrets, as long as they are made in express or implied
confidence. 53  Washington's courts, however, have noted that
sensitive information can be readily ascertainable through a product
itself where its design reveals the process that created it. 54
combination itself is unique and largely unknown. See id. at 919-20 (relying on Trandes
Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 798 F. Supp. 284, 288 (D. Md. 1992)). Furthermore, the
court announced, a defendant cannot divert liability by asserting that his or her concept
could have been independently created, if in fact it was not.
149. See U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Office of Consumer Advocate, 498 N.W.2d
711, 714 (Iowa 1993).
150. 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548,550 (Iowa 1994).
151. See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1990);
Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 217 A.2d 375, 377 (Md. 1966);
Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (Md. App. 1991); Dworkin v. Blumenthal,
551 A.2d 947, 950 (Md. App. 1989).
152. See Centrol, Inc. v. Morrow, 489 N.W.2d 890,894-95 (S.D. 1992).
153. See Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110, 113
(Va. 1990). Incidentally, the leading British trade secrets case discussed the obligation of
confidence as the second of three elements required for a plaintiff to protect her
confidential information, after a finding that the information possessed the requisite
secrecy and before a finding of a breach:
It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man
standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that
upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence,
then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of
confidence. In particular where information is of commercial or industrial value
is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind,
such as a joint venture or the manufacture of articles by one party for the other, I
would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a
contention that he was bound by a duty of confidence.
Coco v. Clark [1969] RPC 41,48.
154. See Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 674 (Wash. 1987) (en bane); see
also Public Sys., Inc. v. Towry, 587 So. 2d 969, 971-72 (Ala. 1991) (holding that a
spreadsheet software program was not a trade secret because the information that was
allegedly a secret could be derived easily from publicly available testimony).
Alternatively, an Alabama court has protected information as a trade secret
despite evidence that others competent in the given field could easily duplicate it. See,
e.g., Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130,133 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (citing KFC
Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Sperry Rand Corp. v.




Unless misappropriation is also shown, proving that information
is a trade secret is fruitless under state law. 5  As previously
illustrated in McCoy, unconditioned disclosure of information foils a
showing of misappropriation. 6 In addition to McCoy, five cases in
North Carolina provide guidance on how misappropriation may be
proven or defeated.57
In Merck & Co. v. Lyon,5 ' the court held that a credible threat of
misappropriation was revealed when the pharmaceutical company
Merck sought an injunction against a former employee from working
on Zantac (R) 75 at Glaxo Welcome, his new employer.'59 The
employee, Gary A. Lyon, earlier had been exposed to secret
information when he worked on Pepcid (R) AC at Merck, including
the nature of a drug supply agreement and the projected launch dates
of various drugs.160 Merck's "inevitable disclosure" theory was
coupled with proof of the precise nature of at least some information
that was claimed to be a trade secret and to which Lyon had access.' 6'
The court granted an injunction because Merck also showed that
Lyon was not entirely forthright about the particulars of his new
position at Glaxo Weilcome; the court found that this new position
155. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-153 (1992) (granting any trade-secret owner a civil
remedy for the misappropriation of her trade secret).
156. See supra note 11.
157. See infra notes 158-81 and accompanying text.
158. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
159. See id. at 1456,1458, 1460-61, 1463.
160. See id. at 1451, 1457, 1459.
161. See id. at 1457-58. The court supported its decision by analyzing PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). That court found that the defendant took
knowledge of particular plans and processes to a competitor rather than simply general
skills and knowledge, and an injunction was granted because the disclosure of the
plaintiff's information was inevitable. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1457-48. Articulating its
inevitability theory, the PepsiCo court stated that unless the defendant "possessed an
uncanny ability to compartmentalize information, he would necessarily be making
decisions about Gatorade and Snapple by relying on his knowledge of [PepsiCo's] trade
secrets." PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1269. Moreover, the court in PepsiCo noted that the
defendant's "lack of forthrightness on some occasions, and out and out lies on others"
bolstered the trial court's belief that he "could not be trusted to act with the necessary
sensitivity and good faith." Id. at 1270.
In Merck, however, Glaxo argued that North Carolina courts have refused to
apply the doctrine of inevitable discovery. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1458. Three cases
were cited in support of that assertion: FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F.
Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Union Carbide Corp. v. Sunox, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 224
(W.D.N.C. 1984); and Travenol Lab, Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 228 S.E.2d 478
(1976). All three were deemed "not to support Glaxo's argument." Merck, 941 F. Supp.
at 1458.
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involved similar responsibilities to those he handled at Merck.162 The
court's analysis espoused the notion of inevitable disclosure and
paved the way for plaintiffs to prove misappropriation by showing
that the information would be useful in the new environment and that
the defendant may be hiding his true intentions regarding the
treatment of the trade secret.
Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
corporation had shown a prima facie case of trade secret
misappropriation in Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning.163 In that case, a
corporation selling lumber processing equipment sued a former
employee who had developed computer software to create a lumber
optimization system during his employment and, after leaving,
incorporated his own company to customize those systems.164 The
court held that evidence showing the computer software was
distributed in a form that was virtually impossible to alter established
the employer's intent to maintain the secrecy of how its processing
system worked."5 The defendant had access to copies of the source
codes before he resigned, and the court held that a preliminary
injunction was appropriate because trade secret injury is of such a
continuous and frequent recurrence that no other reasonable redress
could be provided by a court.66
In North Carolina Electric Membership Corp. v. North Carolina
Department of Economic and Community Development,167  a
wholesale cooperative electric membership corporation contested a
competitor's attempt to gain access to documents that it had filed in
an application to receive federal funds.'6 Affirming the trial court's
162. See id. at 1460-61. Lyon's exit interview did not include the presentation of a non-
competition agreement, which the court found to "weigh heavily" against entering an
injunction prohibiting Lyon from being hired by a competitor. See id. at 1461. The Merck
court considered the lack of such a contract to indicate the limited value of Lyon's trade
secrets information, and also noted the absence of evidence that Glaxo hired Lyon for his
privileged knowledge. See id. The court did acknowledge, however, that Lyon's
misrepresentations to Merck that he would not join a competitor-when joined with
Merck's reliance on earlier confidentiality agreements, verbal reminders, and industry
practice-made its failure to pursue a non-competition contract "somewhat more
reasonable." Id. at 1457.
163. 108 N.C. App. 590,424 S.E.2d 226 (1993).
164. See id. at 592-93, 424 S.E.2d at 227-28.
165. See id. at 595-96, 424 S.E.2d at 229. Yet absolute secrecy is not required, which
the court supported with a New York opinion. See id. (citing Q-CO Indus., Inc. v.
Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
166. See Barr-Mullin, 108 N.C. App. at 597, 424 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting from Barrier v.
Troutman, 231 N.C. 47,50,55 S.E.2d 923,925 (1949)).
167. 108 N.C. App. 711,425 S.E.2d 440 (1993).
168. See id. at 714, 425 S.E.2d at 442. The cooperative provided electric energy at
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denial of a preliminary injunction, 69 the court of appeals held that the
plaintiff failed to show misappropriation and thus could not prevail
under the NCTSA, despite the apparent existence of a trade secret.7 °
Failing to prove misappropriation was the result of not having any
evidence to satisfy the elements, as the competitor had not acquired,
disclosed, or used any of the information before the lawsuit was
initiated.'
Glaxo also failed to prove misappropriation of a trade secret in
the previously discussed Glaxo case. 72 Glaxo had been involved in a
related lawsuit against Novopharm, and in that suit it freely
introduced information it later claimed to contain trade secrets.73
The court noted that the prior trial had been "closely scrutinized by
the industry" and that Novopharm "had every reason to believe the
information was not a secret."'74 The release of information for trial
defeated Glaxo's attempt to prove misappropriation under the
NCTSPA.
Another NCTSPA plaintiff failed to prove its case for
misappropriation in FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co.75 There
wholesale prices to member corporations who, in turn, supplied electricity to residents.
See id. For a more detailed review of the facts, see infra notes 259-67 and accompanying
text.
169. See id. at 716, 425 S.E.2d at 443.
170. See id. at 718-19, 425 S.E.2d at 444-45.
171. See id. at 719, 425 S.E.2d at 445. The Public Records Act offered a remedy,
however, which led the appellate court to reverse and remand to the trial court for entry
of a preliminary injunction pending a trial on the merits. See id. at 721, 425 S.E.2d at 446.
172 See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
173. See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 830 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff'd,
52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In this earlier case, Novopharm retained an expert witness
who had access to several confidential Glaxo documents that were submitted during
discovery under a protective order. The expert specifically acknowledged the protective
order in her affidavit. See id. at 875-86. She was then hired by Novopharm and joined its
development team, yet Novopharm had already developed its method for producing the
drug that Glaxo in the later case claimed was misappropriated. See Glaxo, Inc. v.
Novopharm, Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1303 (E.D.N.C. 1996), aff'd, 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Glaxo asserted that the doctor's newfound expertise in that drug was wholly the
result of her exploration of Glaxo's documents, but the court rejected claims that she
violated the protective order or that she would inevitably disclose what she learned. See
id., at 1303. The court said that the protective order itself excluded restrictions from
documents used as exhibits in court, and all the documents at issue were exhibits. See id.
Another reason for the court's rejecting Glaxo's arguments was that Novopharm did not
have specific opportunity to acquire the secrets. See id. The court also found that
Novopharm hired her as an expert, not Glaxo, yielding an atypical trade secrets situation
where Glaxo would have to prove that the doctor could not have learned the information
at Novopharm but for her having seen the Glaxo documents, since employees are free to
take their skills elsewhere. See id.
174. Glaxo, 931 F. Supp. at 1302.
175. 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
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the manufacturer of battery-quality lithium products sued a former
employee of fourteen years to prohibit him from disclosing trade
secrets to his new employer, the plaintiff's sole competitor in the
United States.176 The court held that the plaintiff only had surmised a
possibility of misappropriation but had not established a real threat. 77
No real threat existed, according to the court, because the competitor
had not labored to lure away the employee, and the employee had
neither taken nor offered to provide trade secrets to the competitor.
17 8
The court recognized that the parties supplied those facts without
hard evidence but stated that it had no reason to suspect either
defendant of lying. 79 Personal reasons seemed to spark the career
move, the court said, and the employee's specialized skill would not
be sought by just any corporation.8 0 Therefore, the court rejected the
plaintiff's misappropriation claim because it rested solely on the fact
that the plaintiff's former employee left to work for the competitor."'
Other state laws on misappropriation echo North Carolina's in
most respects, although nine jurisdictions have not yet addressed the
issue under their trade secrets acts.18 Other than those nine, almost
all states with civil trade secrets acts have discussed the particulars of
misappropriation only briefly.' 83 Usually, the most heavily litigated
issue in trade secrets cases is whether an owner tried to protect the
trade secret. This is not a misappropriation question despite the
conceptual overlap.184 The appellate courts of a few states have
decided a few helpful cases interpreting the parameters of
176. See id. at 1479.
177. See id. at 1481. With regard to the burden of proof, in AG Sys., Inc. V. United
Decorative Plastics Corp., 55 F.3d 970 (4th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff challenged a jury
instruction that referred to a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the
"substantial evidence" standard appearing in the NCTSPA. See id. at 972-73. The
appellate court held that the error was harmless, since the plaintiff failed to object to the
instruction at trial, and invited the mistake by proposing the wrong wording himself. See
id
178. See FMC Corp., 899 F. Supp. at 1481.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.; see also Pat K. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine, 67 N.C. L. REV. 435,439 (1989) (arguing that courts should give more protection
to the interests of former employees by using a reasonable expectation test to evaluate
claims that pursuit of a business opportunity by the ex-employee violated a fiduciary
duty).
182. Those jurisdictions are Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and South Carolina. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at
24,195,247,363,557,584,630,817.
183. See supra note 15; supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's
interpretation of "trade secrets").
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misappropriation,s and none of those cases departs radically from
trade secrets legal principles in North Carolina." 6
In California, for instance, an employee must actually solicit
customers on a trade secret list before liability will be imposed;
merely announcing to those clients that he works for a new employer
is not enough.'" Delaware's statute requires that a third party
receiving misappropriated information know or have reason to know
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means.18s A court
interpreting that statute held that, in order to defeat a claim of
misappropriation, the purchaser of a product may rely on the seller's
assurance that it owned the technology without further
investigation.8 9 In Rhode Island, misappropriation of a trade secret
is analyzed in the context of breach of confidence and fiduciary duty,
with a focus on egregiousness of conduct. 190 Regarding proof of such
conduct, a Virginia court, interpreting the laws of that state, found
that a former employer had not proven misappropriation based on
evidence that artwork was missing after the former employee left
work because such evidence did not adequately rebut the former
employee's affidavit that he did not remove the art.19'
C. Information That is Protected
In addition to discovering how the courts handle "trade secrets"
and "misappropriation," knowing the specific types of protected
information facilitates the comparison of trade secret law in existence
185. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 155-81 and accompanying text.
187. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a former employee misappropriated a customer database by calling and
personally visiting the customers with proposals for them to affiliate with the new
corporation); accord Am. Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 101 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (concluding the same upon similar facts).
188. See 6 DEL. CODE ANN. § 2001(2) (1982).
189. See Cabot Corp. v. Thai Tantalum, Inc., No. 12580, 1992 WL 172678, at *4 (Del.
Ch. July 22,1992, as revised July 27, 1992).
190. See E. Container Corp. v. Craine, 624 A.2d 833, 835 (R.I. 1993) (analyzing Abbey
MedJlAbbey Rents, Inc. v. Mignacca, 471 A.2d 189, 193-94 (R.I. 1984), and Rego Displays,
Inc. v. Fournier, 379 A.2d 1098, 1101-03 (R.I. 1977), cases that predated the passage of
Rhode Island's trade secrets act). These cases are applicable because they are based on
common law, which the state acts codified.
Likewise, Tennessee law -- despite its not having a trade secrets act-declares that
agents have a fiduciary duty not to use confidential information for personal benefit and
must reimburse the principal for such misuse, even where the employer suffered no harm.
See Pinehurst, Ltd. v. Jarratt, No. 01-A-01-9106-CH-00208, 1991 WL 241184, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1991) (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,27-28 (1987)).
191. See Reynolds and Reynolds Co. v. Hardee, 932 F. Supp. 149, 155-56 (E.D. Va.
1996).
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throughout the nation. North Carolina cases deal with several types
of information, most of which echo cases from other jurisdictions.
192
Eight cases deal with scientific or computer knowledge, 93 and six
address business or customer information 94
1. Scientific or Computer Information in North Carolina
The eight published opinions on the NCTSPA that have
addressed scientific or computer information are discussed briefly
below to provide the complete picture of North Carolina's case law
on these subjects. First, in Merck,95 a case discussed earlier for its
analysis of misappropriation,'96 the court held that the projected
launch dates and marketing plan for a new drug were competitively
valuable information, not generally known, and sufficient to enjoin
disclosure by a former employee to his new employer, the plaintiff's
competitor.Y7 The plaintiff asserted that the revelation of its trade
secret would cause it to lose a significant portion of its market share,
since Merck's Pepcid (R) AC and Glaxo's Zantac (R) 75 were in
direct competition. According to Merck, if Glaxo were to discover
the nature of one of Merck's supply agreements, the projected launch
dates of various Pepcid (R) AC line extensions, and the 1996
Canadian Pepcid (R) AC marketing launch plan, it would receive an
immediate advantage. The court agreed, stating that such
information were trade secrets. 99
Conversely, the court in FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral
Co.2' held that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that
its processes were trade secrets because the defendant indicated that
it could purchase the same products elsewhere.2"' In FMC, the
manufacturer of battery-quality lithium products sued a competitor
and former employee seeking to prohibit the employee from
disclosing trade secrets to the competitor in breach of a
confidentiality agreement. FMC asserted that its Anderson cell was a
trade secret, but the defendant showed it was available on the market
192. See infra notes 195-291 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 195-253 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 254-91 and accompanying text.
195. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
196. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
197. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1459.
198. See id. at 1456-57.
199. See id. at 1457.
200. 899 F. Supp. 1477 (w.D.N.C. 1995).
201. See id. at 1481.
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from three or four other vendors.2 2 " FMC also claimed that its dry
room and special packaging techniques were secrets, but the
defendant responded that it had operated a, dry room for about
seventeen years and had also employed vacuum packaging.2 3 The
laminating of current-collecting metals with lithium was also claimed
to be a trade secret, but again the defendant countered that it used
the same processes.2 FMC further argued that its ultra-thin foil and
special winding capacity were not known, yet the defendant said it
had the same technology.2 5 FMC's other claims included having
superior extrusion technology, unique battery production, particular
manufacturing efficiencies, exceptional alloy production, and better
tolerance in the alloys.25 The court was skeptical about FMC's claim
that it had trade Secrets in almost every stage of production of
battery-quality lithium metals and found the support for those
allegations to be too unspecific.' In fact, the court commented that
it was not certain what it was being asked to enjoin the defendantemployee from disclosing, for the competing corporations seemed to
have almost identical technologies. The court considered the
similarity in innovation quite foreseeable, given the nature of their
products.209 Thus, the FMC court refused to find that the plaintiff had
established trade secrets in need of protection.210
The court also refused to find a trade secret in Glaxo, Inc. v.
Novopharm, Ltd. ' Because Glaxo's choice of solvent system, pH,
temperature, and seeding, which was used to determine the
polymorphic form of a ranitidine hydrochloride crystal, was generally






207. See id. at 1482.
208. See id.
209. See id. Moreover, the plaintiff and defendant in this case were the only two
producers of battery-quality lithium products in the United States. See id. at 1479.
210. See id. at 1483. The court explained that FMC sought a broader remedy than one
offered under the NCTSPA, namely an injunction to keep its former employee from
performing any research and development for the competitor in the seven general areas in
which he worked for FMC. See id. at 1482-83. The court said that remedy is typically
obtainable with a covenant not to compete, which was not present in this case. See id.
211. 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1302 (E.D.N.C. 1996), affd, 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, the court stated that where a real trade secret exists, it should avoid discussion
of the particular secret so as not to deprive the plaintiffs of the rights they sought to
vindicate by filing suit. See id. at 1299.
212. See id. at 1300. The court explained that, while different methods for
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by Glaxo witnesses that those crystallization factors were not
generally known in this field was not credible, especially in light of
the fact that such information was made public by Glaxo in a previous
trial.
213
The relative overtness of the matters Glaxo sought to protect,
rather than the nature of the information, defeated its bid for
establishing a trade secret.214 Glaxo contended that the scientific
community would not investigate trial transcripts, court exhibits, or
the Federal Supplement, and that the information contained therein
was still confidential, but the court disagreed.215 Glaxo also argued
unsuccessfully that Novopharm created the disclosure by its patent
infringement in the previous case and should not benefit from that
misdeed.216 In any event, the court found that knowledge of the
variables influencing ranitidine hydrochloride crystallization was well
known to chemists in that field and, therefore, qualified as readily
discoverable.
217
Five years earlier, the court of appeals in S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc.
v. Huffines2 8 analyzed whether animals could be treated as trade
manufacturing crystals are available, ranitidine hydrochloride is produced by a solvent
system process. See id. at 1299-1300. Some amount of ranitidine base is dissolved into a
"solvent system," a liquid which may be composed of various solvents in varying
proportions. See id. Hydrochloride is then added to facilitate crystallization, and
ranitidine crystals precipitate from the solution, usually aided by a reagent. See id. The
court continued that while the molecular behavior during crystallization is not well
understood, it is apparent that subtle manipulation of the solution during the process can
profoundly affect the type of crystal that forms. See id. at 1300. The crystallization factors
relevant to the case included the choice of solvent system, pH level, temperature, and the
degree of "seeding," which is the practice of adding crystals to the solution to influence the
formation of crystals of the same type. See id. at 1300 n.20.
213. See id. In fact, the court noted that Glaxo made some of the information known
as early as 1984, with the publication of an article titled Spectroscopic Studies on
Ranitidine-Its Structure and the Influence of Temperature andpH. See id.
214. See id. at 1300-02.
215. See id. at 1300. The court agreed that scientific research generally misses legal
libraries and courthouses but maintained that the pharmaceutical industry had an interest
in this litigation. See id. Indeed, copies of trial transcripts had been purchased by several
researchers, numerous visitors examined the trial exhibits from the first case, and
representatives from both pharmaceutical companies had attended both trials. See id.
216. See id. at 1300-02. The court responded that, although a party responsible for
divulging the trade secret of another may not benefit from that act, Glaxo is responsible
for its own dissemination. See id. at 1300. The court quoted the NCrSPA to find that the
owner of the secret has an affirmative duty to maintain secrecy and, regardless of
testimony indicating that Glaxo was dutiful at its facilities, that the failure occurred
somewhere between the laboratory and the courthouse. See id. at 1301. That is, Glaxo
failed to take the legal steps-such as sealing the exhibits and conducting an in-camera
hearing-required to maintain secrecy during trial. See id.
217. See id. at 1302.
218. 101 N.C. App. 292,399 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
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secrets. In that case, a student organization named Students for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals sued an experimentation group for
disclosure of documents that the researchers alleged were trade
secrets.219 The court responded that what type and how many animals
will be used in a particular research project is not a trade secret, nor is
whether surgery would be performed or the type of anesthesia to be
used. 20 Pre- and post-operative procedures were not trade secrets
either, according to the court, and neither was information about how
an animal's pain could be minimized nor the method of euthanasia 21
The court reasoned that the students wanted only a brief discussion of
the justification for the research and its objectives. The court
reviewed these in camera and determined that they were not trade
secrets.m
In Moore v. American Barmag Corp.,m the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina held that an inventive
thread path design and yarn processing method may constitute a
trade secret under North Carolina law for purposes of surviving a
motion for summary judgment2 4 The court stated that the plaintiff
had submitted evidence that at the time he disclosed his invention to
the defendant, the information may have fit the definition of a trade
secret because it was a device that conferred a business advantage
219. See id. at 296,399 S.E.2d at 343. The researchers also argued that the information
was protected as confidential and proprietary in order to ensure the safety and security of
the researcher. A "chilling effect" would doom university research, the scientists argued;
however, the court noted that the applications were so general in nature, revealing little
information, that this effect should not occur. See id. at 295 (citing Univ. of Pennsylvania
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990)). In response to
that concern, the court of appeals concluded that public policy did require redaction from
the researchers' federal applications of their names, addresses, telephone numbers,
experience, and department. See S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, 101 N.C. App. at 296, 399 S.E.2d at
343. The scientists also argued that their federal applications could not be made public
because they were protected under the First Amendment, which they contended creates
an academic exception for disclosure of documents. See id. at 297, 399 S.E.2d at 343.
However, the same United States Supreme Court case rejected that argument after the
trial court in S.E.T.A. UNC-CH had ruled. See id. at 297, 399 S.E.2d at 343-44 (citing
Univ. of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 197).
220. See S.E. T.A. UNC-CH, 101 N.C. App. at 296,399 S.E.2d at 343.
221. See id. The court did not identify the precise reasons why such information failed
to satisfy the definition of trade secret under the NCTSPA but thought they were too
general to be trade secrets. See id. at 297, 399 S.E.2d at 343.
222 See id.; see also ASPCA v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 556 N.Y.S.2d 447,
450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that questions asked regarding justification and
objective of research on an application from the Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee-the same application as that used in S.E.T.A. UNC-CH-were not trade
secrets under state law, which does not include a trade secrets protection act).
223. 710 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
224. See id. at 1059-60.
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over competitors.m Moreover, the plaintiff satisfied the statutory
definition under the NCTSPA, according to the court, and the court
declared that one who wrongfully uses that secret shall be liable for
the misdeed.226
Similarly, in Travenol Labs, Inc. v. Turner,2 7 a pre-NCTSPA
case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the modification
of a widely known manufacturing method may constitute a trade
secretY' In that case, a pharmaceutical manufacturer sued a former
employee and competitor to protect its trade secret and to limit the
former, employee's new employment'. 9  The employee, who
voluntarily left his former job, spent his career in production
positions, was a skilled manager, and had some technical knowledge
that he had acquired ancillary to his production skills.230 Specifically,
he knew about a mechanical modification of a particular type of
centrifuge that other competitors had unsuccessfully attempted to
duplicate. 3 However, his former employer's competitor hired him in
production, not research and development.32 The court of appeals
held that he could be enjoined from disclosing confidential
information but could not be precluded from working for the
competitor altogether.233
225. See id. The court cited Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163,
171 (5th Cir. 1969), to support its conclusion.
226. See id. at 1060-61. Borrowing time-tested holdings from Booth v. Stutz Motor Car
Co. of Am., 56 F.2d 962, 968-69 (7th Cir. 1932), and Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80
F.2d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1935), the Moore court supported its decision to permit the
plaintiff to proceed with its evidence. See Moore, 710 F. Supp. at 1060-61. The premise
for that ruling was that the plaintiff had not disclosed his invention to anyone other than
two employees who assisted him in making the prototype of the invention at his former
workplace and only then disclosing it in confidence. See id. at 1058. Before disclosing the
knowledge to the defendant, the plaintiff asked for and received assurances that the
corporation would compensate him for using the information, but the defendant disclosed
the invention to the public and began using it on its own machines, rejecting the plaintiff's
demand for compensation. See id. The defendants did not contradict these averments.
See id.
227. 30 N.C. App. 686,228 S.E.2d 478 (1976).
228. See id. at 694-95,228 S.E.2d at 485.
229. See id. at 687,228 S.E.2d at 480.
230. See id. at 688-89,228 S.E.2d at 481-82.
231. See id. at 694-95, 228 S.E.2d at 485. The court rejected the plaintiffs claim,
however, that its former employee had other valuable information about the plasma
fractionation process, whereby human blood components are extracted and processed.
See id. at 695,228 S.E.2d at 485. The reason was that most industries in the same business
use a standard process in their plasma fractionation operations, and the plaintiff failed to
show how its process was unique other than by using its modified centrifuge. See id. at
695, 228 S.E.2d at 485.
232. See id. at 688-89, 228 S.E.2d at 481.
233. See id. at 694,696,228 S.E.2d at 484-86.
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Like the centrifuge in Travenol, a computer program may be
protected under North Carolina law if reasonable efforts are made to
maintain the secrecy of the program, according to the court in Barr-
Mullin, Inc. v. Browning.P The defendants in Barr-Mullin argued
that the disputed software named COMPU-RIP was not a trade
secret because it was not subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its
secrecy and it had been reverse engineered. 5 The latter allegation
was rejected abruptly for its lack of evidence, but in order to
determine the effort to maintain secrecy, the court investigated the
nature of the computer program z'6 The COMPU-RIP software was
contained in the form of "programmable read-only memory chips"
(PROMS) embedded in the COMPU-RIP machinery. 7  The
PROMS contained the "object code" version of the program which is
"read" by the computer's machinery.2'5 Computer programmers,
however, write software in "source code," later to be translated into
object code for the computer to execute its program functions.3 9 The
COMPU-RIP software was sold in PROM form, so the source code
was unavailable to the public. 4 Two experts stated that distribution
-in object code form renders alteration of the software "practically
impossible."241  Furthermore, the plaintiff's president stated by
affidavit that access to the software was limited to the plaintiff's
employees and consultants.242 The court was satisfied that reasonable
efforts were expended to maintain secrecy of the COMPU-RIIP
software.2 43
The final science-related trade secrets case in North Carolina is
Miraft Inc. v Murphy.2' In Mirafi, the court gave two reasons for
holding that the defendant did not have knowledge of a trade secret
at the time he left his former employer.2 45 First, there existed no
business or technical information relating to a prefabricated
234. 108 N.C. App. 590,424 S.E.2d 226 (1993).




239. See id; see also Brown, supra note 25, at 979 n.14 (explaining the process of
translating the object code into source code).
240. See Barr-Mullin, 108 N.C. App. at 595,424 S.E.2d at 229.
241. Id. at 595-96,424 S.E.2d at 229.
242. See id. at 595, 424 S.E.2d at 229; see also Q-CO Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F.
Supp. 608, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that secrecy for computer programs is not
compromised when only the object code version is distributed to customers).
243. See Barr-Mullin, 108 N.C. App. at 596,424 S.E.2d at 229.
244. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
245. See id. at 1349.
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drainboard that derived actual or potential commercial value from
not being generally known in the industry.2 46 Second, the court found
that the former employer had not exerted reasonable efforts to
maintain the secrecy of any information relating to the drainboard.247
Several years prior to the Mirafi appellate decision, the plaintiff
sold only one prefabricated drainboard, known then as Miradrain and
later as Miradrain 4000, that was used almost exclusively in large
construction projects 2 s The product had dimples protruding from
both sides of a plastic core, creating a "waffle" design and providing
flow channels on both sides for liquid.2 49 Its successor, the Miradrain
6000, was more functional, cheaper, and easier to fabricate than the
earlier model5 0 However, there were a number of competitive
products available in the marketplace that looked almost identical to
the Miradrain 6000, including Aquadrain 15X, Amerdrain, and
Bradley Filter Drain?51 In fact, the plaintiff sold the Miradrain 6000
product to a competitor who resold the product under its private label
and did not recognize the plaintiff as the product's original creator. 52
Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff failed to conduct exit interviews
or any equivalent conversation for any of the six or more employees
who had worked on the product before leaving the company resulted
in the holding that secrecy of the product had not been reasonably
maintained.253
2. Business Information in North Carolina
The six North Carolina cases addressing trade secrets claims in
conjunction with business information or customer lists, rather than
with scientific pursuits, are summarized below to present the entirety
of North Carolina's case law on business information. First, in
Wilmington Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Regional Medical
Center,z54 the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that negotiated
price lists in a contract between a public hospital and a private health
maintenance organization could be "trade secrets" under the
NCTSPA5 5  That ruling was based on the importance of
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 1340.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 1343.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1342.
254. 125 N.C. App. 174,480 S.E.2d 53 (1997).
255. See id. at 182, 480 S.E.2d at 57.
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confidentiality in maintaining competition among HMOs, the HMO's
protection of the lists at issue, and the difficulty competitors would
endure to obtain the materials0 6 The court held nonetheless that the
lists were not protected from disclosure as trade secrets because the
Public Records Act' 7 applies only to trade secrets belonging to
private persons, not government agencies. I
In North Carolina Electric Membership Corp., introduced above
in the context of misappropriation, 59 the court found a similar trade
secret. The plaintiff was a cooperative electric membership
corporation that provided electric energy at wholesale prices to
twenty-seven members, who in turn supplied electricity to
approximately 500,000 North Carolina retail customers.m Electric
membership corporations such as the plaintiff are required by statute
to apply for funding through the defendant, the North Carolina
Department of Economic and Community Development, rather than
directly to federal agencies.26' Duke Power Company requested to
see the documents that the plaintiff had filed with the defendant over
a period of years, alleging that they were public records and "must be
256. See id. at 179-82, 480 S.E.2d at 55-57. The court found that disclosing the financial
terms of the contract between an HMO and a hospital would be valuable to the
competitors of that HMO and that "each HMO member of the North Carolina HMO
Association considers the financial terms of its agreements with health care providers to
be confidential trade secrets." Id. at 181, 480 S.E.2d at 55-57. Second, it held that
divulging the financial terms between HMOs and health care providers would be
detrimental to industry competition, that it "would impair the ability of HMOs to control
the rising costs of health care," and that "'secret pricing'" is more important to vigorous
competition in a concentrated market. Id. The court further stated that the defendants
were in a concentrated market, "that HMOs in North Carolina and nationally view price
terms of their contracts with health providers as extremely important to keep secret," and
that the defendant advised the hospital that the prices were confidential at the start of
negotiations. Id. at 181, 480 S.E.2d at 57. Last, the court found that the contract specified
the parties agreed to maintain its confidentiality, that the price lists were accessible only to
a small number of individuals, that physicians were blocked from the lists, and that a
competing organization would be troubled to generate the information. See id at 181-82,
480 S.E.2d at 57.
257. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -10 (1995).
258. See id. at 182, 480 S.E.2d at 57. The court recognized that its holding might
disadvantage public hospitals in their competition with non-governmental entities but
deferred that problem to the legislature; the court quoted a federal court which stated that
"[d]isclosure of prices charged the Government is a cost of doing business with the
Government." Id. (quoting Racal-Milgo Gov't Sys. v. Small Bus. Admin., 559 F. Supp. 4,6
(D.D.C. 1981)).
259. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
260. See North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Econ. and
Community Dev., 108 N.C. App. 711,714,425 S.E.2d 440,442 (1993).
261. See id.
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disclosed pursuant to North Carolina's Public Record Act. ' 262 The
documents contained data concerning the plaintiff's Long Range
Financial Forecast and Member Rate Forecast for Mobile Substation
Programs, a summary of feasibility studies in support of a deficiency
loan for participation in a county, and a financial forecast for that
county which had been designated "Confidential" when submitted. 63
Supplementing its motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff
submitted an affidavit of its consultant and a verified complaint.264
Taken together, the court found reason to believe that the documents
in question contained valuable business information, namely the
plaintiff's projections for sales to its members and its methodologies
for forecasting price information. 65  Additionally, the court
recognized that such information would be of "actual value" to Duke
Power Company and to other competitors and would "cause
irreparable harm" to the plaintiff.2 66 Thus, the evidence was adequate
to show a likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the trade
secret issue in court.2 67
The court held in McCoy, however, that a business plan that
could be divined by another creative person in the field is not a trade
secret.26 In that case the plaintiff had conjured a business idea and
promoted it with brochures.269 His unqualified dissemination-and
personal practice in his travel agencies-of the concept further voided
any claim for trade secret protection.2 70
With regard to customer lists, the North Carolina Supreme Court
first granted trade secret protection while applying Illinois law in
United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall.271 The defendant had
procured a sales representative position with the plaintiff corporation
in 1971, and after a temporary interlude working for a competitor
followed by three years working as a manager for the plaintiff, he
remained a sales representative until his resignation in 1985.272 He
then joined a competing chemical manufacturer in the same capacity
262. Id.
263. See id. at 715, 425 S.E.2d at 442.




268. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
269. See Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, 802 F. Supp. 1358, 1358 (E.D.N.C. 1992), affd
sub nQm. Amariglio-Dunn v. McCoy, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993).
270. See id. at 1360.
271. 322 N.C. 643,370 S.E.2d 375 (1988).
272. See id. at 644-46,370 S.E.2d 377-78.
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and approached the customers he had serviced prior to his
resignation. 3 The supreme court distinguished the Illinois case upon
which the court of appeals had exclusively relied, holding that the
plaintiff had a near-permanent relationship with its .customers and
that the defendant acquired confidential information about them.2 74
Had he worked elsewhere, the court said the defendant would not
have known such information as the customers' requirements, "the
cyclical nature of their buying habits, the prices each was willing to
pay, and any specialized product formulations," all of which the
plaintiff's competitors did not know.275 The defendant in United
Laboratories had been employed by the plaintiff for approximately
fourteen years, throughout which the plaintiff enjoyed a long-term
relationship with its customers, and the defendant had not known the
customers before his employment with the plaintiff.2 76 Thus, the
defendant's customer lists were trade secrets under Illinois law.n
In Consolidated Textiles, Inc. v. Sprague,278 the trial court
similarly enjoined a former employee from further disclosure of trade
secrets 7 9 The injunction forbade the defendant from contacting or
disclosing to third parties his former employer's customers who had
been actively solicited within one year prior to his resignation.? ° The
court of appeals refused to hear an appeal, holding that the
defendant's substantial rights had not been affected by the
preliminary injunction.2s' The plaintiff had moved under the
NCTSPA to prevent the defendant from breaching his non-
competition agreement, and the fact that the defendant was restricted
from only three hundred of the several thousand remaining potential
customers meant that no substantial right had been frustrated,
according to the court.s2
Finally, in Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services,
273. See id. at 646, 370 S.E.2d at 378.
274. See id. at 656-57, 370 S.E.2d at 384.
275. Id. at 657,370 S.E.2d at 384.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. 117 N.C. App. 132,450 S.E.2d 348 (1994).
279. See id. at 133,450 S.E.2d at 349.
280. See id at 134,450 S.E.2d at 349.
281. See id.
282. See id. But see Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 111 N.C. App. 866, 870, 433 S.E.2d
811, 814 (1993) (finding a substantial right affected because the injunction prevented the
defendants from installing air-conditioners during the prime season); Masterclean of N.C.
v. Guy, 82 N.C. App. 45, 52, 345 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1986) (finding a substantial right affected
where an injunction prevented the defendant from doing his job in five states).
21851999]
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Inc., the former General Manager of the defendant publishing
company was familiar with the bidding and pricing of printing
contracts, had access to pricing information, and had contacted the
company's customers. Before he resigned to work for a competitor,
he assisted his newly hired replacement in overbidding an account
that he himself later acquired by bidding lower from his new place of
employment. Surprisingly, the former manager initiated the
lawsuit, to which the defendant counterclaimed alleging interference
with contractual and business relationships, misappropriation of trade
secrets, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.? 6 The defendant's
motion for summary judgment, which reserved all its counterclaims,
was granted in its entirety by the trial judge. 7 The court of appeals
held that the customer lists and pricing and bidding formulae were
trade secrets under the NCTSPA, but the court provided only indirect
reasoning for its holding.m Specifically, the court stated that the trial
court's findings supported that court's conclusion identifying trade
secrets. 9 In addition, the court was unable to answer whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the lower court's findings because
the plaintiff failed to provide a verbatim transcript of the proceedings
consistent with the state rules of appellate procedure.20  Therefore,
the court of appeals refrained from speculation and assumed that the
findings of fact were supported by competent evidence.291
3. Information That is Protected in Other States
Other states also have found trade secrets in both scientific and
business information 92 Scientific trade secrets include knowledge
about computer software, the health industry, specialized
manufacturing processes, and ordinary household items 93 Business
283. 108 N.C. App. 169,423 S.E.2d 324 (1992).
284. See id. at 170,423 S.E.2d at 325.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 171, 423 S.E.2d at 325.
287. See id. at 174, 423 S.E.2d at 327.
288 See id.
289. See id. at 173, 423 S.E.2d at 327.
290. See id.
291. See id. The court's more legally meaningful holding was that if a violation of the
NCCSPA also satisfied the three-pronged test for a violation under the state statute
prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1994), then the same
conduct would indeed violate both statutes. See Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423
S.E.2d at 326. This is regardless of the fact that no part of the NCrSPA specifies that,
when it is violated, the unfair and deceptive trade statute may also be violated. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (1992).
292. See infra notes 296-357 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 296-330 and accompanying text.
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information includes customer lists, sales and pricing information, and
other documents such as proposals and customer complaint
records.2 94 Nine states, however, have not specifically addressed what
items merit protection under their state trade secrets act. 95
With regard to scientific knowledge as a trade secret, several
courts have addressed computer and software disputes, much like in
Barr-Mullin.2 96 For instance, a Florida case held that the owner of a
source code for a video game program that had been developed for
Nintendo was not required to produce the code during discovery
because it was a trade secret.297 A court in Nevada held that where a
computer program is offered to the public, "its contents may not be
deemed a trade secret unless access to it is actually treated as a
secret."29 Moreover, the federal district court in a New Mexico case
implicitly held that computer software programs could be trade
secrets,299 and an Oklahoma court held that a computer program
allowing buyers to transmit insurance claims electronically was a
trade secret under its act. 0
The health industry also accounts for a large number of trade
secrets suits nationwide, most of which are consistent with the
rationales surrounding the health-related cases of Merck, Glaxo, and
Travenol.301  For instance, Illinois courts have held that a
manufacturing process used to produce contact lens material may be
294. See infra notes 331-57 and accompanying text.
295. Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nevada, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming have very little or no case law on what specific
items will be afforded trade secrets protection. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 23-24,
193-95,244-47, 373, 583-84,801-02, 816-17, 935-36,978-79.
296. See supra notes 234-43 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
297. See Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. IJ.E., Inc. 625 So. 2d 1277, 1278-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993). In fact, a few trade secrets acts, such as Montana's, specifically include computer
programs as trade secrets. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-402(4) (1993).
298. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983). This
was Nevada's only case specifying a particular type of information that could be protected
under trade secrets law prior to the passage of its trade secrets act in 1993. See ABA
SURVEY, supra note 51, at 583-84.
299. See Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325-26 (10th
Cir. 1981). Texas courts agree, although that state does not have a civil trade secrets
protection act. See, e.g., Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Powell, 508 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (assessing covenant not to compete as applying to computer systems).
300. See Micro Consulting, Inc. v. Zubeldia, 813 F. Supp. 1514, 1534-35 (W.D. Okla.
1990), affjd, 959 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1992). Similarly, a Utah court held, prior to the
enactment of its trade secrets act, that an accounts receivable computer program is a
secret and, thus, worthy of legal protection. See J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642
P.2d 732,735 (Utah 1982).
301. See supra notes 195-99, 211-17, 227-33 and accompanying text (discussing the
cases).
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protected,30 and before its trade secrets act was adopted in 1989,
Maryland afforded trade secret protection to processes for
manufacturing oxygen-breathing hoses, including blue prints and a
training manual .3 3 A Kansas court found a trade secret in a case that
predated its trade secrets act because the methods, research
information, patents, and machines necessary to create the plaintiff's
process of separating chemicals were unique and intricate, although
generally known 3 4 Oregon law has afforded protection to a drug
formula outside the context of an employment agreement30 5 but
Tennessee courts will not protect a formula for a drug or anything
else that is disclosed to a non-employee unless the parties entered
into a confidentiality agreement.3 °
In addition to cases related to computers and the health industry,
trade secrets cases often involve specialized processes or obscure
methods of manufacturing such as those in FMC and Mirafi.37 For
example, Alabama has held that engineered drawings of rotary
mining drills308 and a process of coating aluminum pipe to produce a
superior, cheaper product3 9 may qualify for protection as a trade
secret. Under Alaska's trade secrets act, oil well data has been held a
trade secret.310  The design of production machines used to grind
extruded rubber into handgrips for sporting equipment, motorcycles,
and tools has been held to be worthy of protection under Arkansas's
act.3 ' A Connecticut court, however, held that a generally known
manufacturing process for making C-seals was not esoteric or
complex and could not be a trade secret. 12 Illinois courts have stated
302. See Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1433-34 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(applying Illinois substantive law).
303. See Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 208 A.2d 74,81 (Md. 1964).
304. See Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 610 P.2d 1094, 1104 (Kan. 1980).
305. See Myers v. Williams, 819 F. Supp. 919,921 (D. Or. 1993).
306. See Turner v. Great Am. Opportunities, Inc., 716 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1986). Tennessee does not have a civil trade secrets act. See supra note 15.
307. See supra notes 200-10,244-53 and accompanying text (discussing the cases).
308. See Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So. 2d 43, 48-49 (Ala. 1983). This
case was decided before the 1987 Act and had limited validity according to the court in
Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33,36 (1991).
309. See Saunders v. Florence Enameling Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 654 (Ala. 1989).
310. See State Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Arctic Slope Reg'l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 139
(Alaska 1991). Alaska courts have not heard any other trade secret case. See ABA
SURVEY, supra note 51, at 23.
311. See Allen v. Johar, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Ark. 1992). In the same case, the
court held that customer lists and information can constitute a trade secret irrespective of
whether the lists were transcribed or memorized. See id. at 827; ABA SURVEY, supra
note 51, at 50.
312- See Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 629 (D. Conn. 1976). But
see Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 144 A.2d 306,310 (Conn. 1958) (holding otherwise for a warm
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that schematics of electronic analog circuitry may be trade secrets.313
However, a fifty-eight step manufacturing process for a fuel nozzle
seal on jet engines was held not a trade secret in Junkunc v. S.J.
Advanced Technology & Manufacturing Corp. In that case, the
nephew of the plaintiff's business partner had been taught openly the
process that he used for twenty years on the job.314 Missouri has
protected knowledge about special methods for manufacturing tools
used by workers who handle "hot" electrical wires,1 a method of
internal culling of chickens,316 and a formula for a non-corrosive
protective coating. Oregon law has afforded protection to
improvements on a biomass extruder device for making fireplace
logs,3 1 engineering drawings,319 and improvements to garbage truck
bodies320 but has denied it to similar items. The state of Washington
protected blueprints for cockpit windows in jet aircraft,321 but refused
protection where information regarding aftermarket replacement of
airplane brakes was readily ascertainable and did not have
independent economic value?23
Products familiar to the public and ordinary household items,
heading process). Both cases predated and were incorporated into the 1983 enactment of
Connecticut's trade secrets act.
313. See Televation Telecommunication Sys., Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359, 1366
(Ill. App. Ct. 2d 1988).
314. See Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Tech. & Mfg. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
315. See A.B. Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). But
see Neil & Spencer Holdings, Ltd. v. Kleen-Rite, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 164, 171 (E.D. Mo.
1979) (holding that the design of a dry-cleaning machine was not a trade secret because
the design was "embodied" in or ascertainable from the apparatus itself, or "contained in
the patent or operating manual"); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 18-
19, 26 (Mo. 1966) (stating that coin rejection machines could be duplicated from existing
machines, albeit with some difficulty, and were not kept secret by their manufacturer, so
therefore they were not trade secrets).
316. See Ultra Life Lab. v. Eames, 221 S.W.2d 224,233-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
317. See Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540,555 (Mo. 1970).
31& See Holland Devs. Ltd. v. Mfrs. Consultants, 724 P.2d 844, 849-50 (Or. App. 1986)
(coming before the state trade secrets act was enacted).
319. See Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 637 P.2d 619, 621 (Or. App. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 657 P.2d 673 (1983). But see Elle v. Babbitt, 488 P.2d 440
(Or. 1971) (denying protection for the design of a pipe mill).
320. See Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912, 922 (Or. 1962). But see E.V. Prentice Dryer
Co. v. Northwest Dryer & Mach. Co., 424 P.2d 227 (Or. 1967) (refusing to protect
improvements in the design of a plywood veneer dryer).
321. See Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 684 (Wash. 1987) (en banc)
(noting that the drawings contained approximately 500 critical tolerances, dimensions,
specifications, and material requirements).
322- See Machen, Inc. v. Aircraft Design, Inc., 828 P.2d 73, 79 (Wash. App. 1992)
(couching its holding in a confidentiality covenant context).
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such as the yarn in Moore,- are the subjects of trade secret
protection as well. Maryland protected methods for manufacturing
ski 324 and a process for making shaving cream. 25 Massachusetts
reached the same result in a case disputing a method for
manufacturing a one-piece, two-tone cultured marble sink top and
bowl, 326 although Massachusetts has not adopted a civil trade secrets
act to date. Missouri has protected a formula for chicken feed,327 but
a Nebraska court held that a food manufacturing process was not a
trade secret where it was generally known throughout the industry,
was not subject to secrecy, was not particularly valuable, had not been
developed at great expense, and would not be very difficult to
duplicate.328 A judge in a New Hampshire products liability case
protected the disclosure of the relative proportions of the ingredients
used in an underarm deodorant,329 yet a court in Minnesota refused
trade secret protection for a researcher who, according to the court,
developed new products by improving on old ones using matters of
common knowledge.3 °
In the area of business information, a myriad of cases address
customer lists that are taken from an employer and used without his
consent, such as in United Laboratories and Consolidated Textiles.3 31
In Delaware, sources of customer contacts have long been recognized
as trade secrets, and a list of a particular, small pool of prospective
applicants for work in a specific industry may constitute a trade secret
if the candidates would be difficult to identify without the list.
3
1
323. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing that case).
324. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974) (protecting
method to manufacture fiberglass skis); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D.
Md. 1958) (protecting method to manufacture metal skis).
325. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557, 580 (D. Md.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.
1956).
326. See Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 799, 802
(Mass. 1977) (relying simplistically on prior cases stating that "manufacturing processes
are entitled to protection as trade secrets.").
327. See Germo Mfg. Co. v. Combs, 240 S.W. 872, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922). But see
Godefroy Mfg. Co. v. Lady Lennox Co., 134 S.W.2d 140,147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (holding
that the formula for black hair dye was not a trade secret because its two main ingredients
were generally known in the hair-dyeing profession).
328. See Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Food Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1081,
1087 (D. Neb. 1974) (deciding the case 20 years before Nebraska adopted the UTSA).
329. See Farnum v. Bristol-Myers Co., 219 A.2d 277, 280 (N.H. 1966) (predating the
state trade secrets act by 24 years).
330. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 690 (D. Minn. 1986), affd,
828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
331. See supra notes 271-77,278-82 and accompanying text (discussing those cases).
332. See Meyer Ventures, Inc. v. Barnak, No. 11502, 1990 WL 172648, at *4 (Del. Ch.
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Although Michigan does not have a civil trade secrets act, it has held
that a customer list may be a trade secret if the list contains a
substantial amount of the employer's customer base.333 In another
customer list case, a Mississippi court considered evidence that most
of the customers solicited by the defendant were his friends,
neighbors, or relatives who likely would have ceased patronizing the
former employer's business anyhow.' A Pennsylvania case stated
that a customer list will be refused protection if it may be generated
readily and easily from trade journals or telephone book listings,
among other references.3 5  And a federal court in South Dakota
noted that the protection afforded to customer lists extends beyond
the writing and includes other information about the customers. 6
Secret sales and pricing information, when it reaches a non-
employee's hands, is also hotly contested nationwide, as it was in
Wilmington Star-News, North Carolina Electric Membership Corp.,
and Drouillard.3 37 New Jersey, without a civil trade secrets act, has
granted protection to sales information that is in "continuous use" in
the business, such as discount codes, rebates, price lists, or catalogues,
and methods of bookkeeping or office management.338 A potentially
contradictory New York case has held that pricing information
cannot constitute a trade secret if it is "disseminated openly to the
public through widely distributed catalogues" and that unpublished
pricing information is not a secret if it "would be outdated and of
Nov. 2, 1990); see also Delmarva Drilling Co. v. American Well Sys., Inc., No. 8521, 1988
WL 7396, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1988) (protecting customer lists); Wilmington Trust Co.
v. Consistent Asset Management Co., No. 8867, 1987 WL 8459, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25,
1987) (protecting the same).
333. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. McCarthy, 780 F. Supp. 458, 462 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(noting, however, that injunctions will not bar defendants from contacting customers who
are already their own, for in such cases the "plaintiff is trying to slam the door of the barn
after the horses are long gone").
334. See Empiregas, Inc. v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971,976 (Miss. 1992).
335. See Mettler-Toledo, Inc. v. Acker, 908 F. Supp. 240, 247 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (citing
Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450,461 (Pa. Super. 1988)).
336. See Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1369 (8th Cir. 1991); see
also 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 58-59 (S.D. 1981) (finding trade secrets
in customer information other than simple listings). When discussing an insurance
agency's customer list, the court in 1st Am. Sys., Inc. said that "the expiration and renewal
dates, personal customer data and customer names and addresses within [the] ... files ...
in fight of the contract's express creation of confidentiality comprise a trade secret even
though separately each item may not rise to that level." 1st Am. Sys., Inc., 311 N.W.2d at
58-59.
337. See supra notes 254-58, 259-67, 283-91 and accompanying text (discussing those
cases).
338. See, e.g., Boost v. Faunce, 80 A.2d 246, 249 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951), aff'd,
17 NJ. Super. 458,86 A.2d 283 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
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little value over a year later." '339 Bid pricing information, as well as
unit price information voluntarily provided by a government
contractor and included in its bid, has been accorded trade secret
status in Virginia.340 Moreover, Pennsylvania, still without a civil
trade secrets act, has held that a price list is not protected as a trade
secret where its contents can be discovered through legitimate means,
such as by contacting suppliers directlyY3'
The protection of business documents and information extending
beyond customer lists and sales information, such as the travel bank
idea in McCoy,342 has been disputed in other state courts as well. For
instance, a form of sales contract prepared by an attorney at a cost of
$2000 for use in sales of master tapes from artists and recording
studios was held in Arizona not to be novel enough to merit trade
secret protection. 3  Similarly, a Georgia newspaper publisher's
intended name for a new newspaper, the "Carrollton Connection,"
was not a trade secret for lack of originality and worthiness of
protection.3 Perhaps using a conflicting rationale, an Indiana court
held that, although the initial identification of off reserve locations
was not a new invention, product, or technology, it represents a
unique discovery of a valuable natural resource and should be
afforded trade secret protectionYM5 A host of articles of information
were protected as trade secrets in a New York case, including the
plaintiff's "financial outlook, marketing strategies, future plans for
the genetic evaluation of cattle and new methods of technician
training and development."4
Alabama has found a trade secret even where documents
containing proposals to customers, customer complaints, and price
339. Ivy Mar Co., Inc. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd., 907 F. Supp. 547, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(deciding without the benefit of a civil trade secrets act).
340. See Environmental Tech., Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 822 F. Supp.
1226, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1993) (basing its ruling on the Freedom of Information Act); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (4th Cir. 1971) (predating the state
trade secrets act). But see Acumenics Research & Tech. v. Dep't of Justice, 843 F.2d 800,
808 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that unit price information was subject to disclosure).
341. See Tyson Metal Prods., Inc. v. McCann, 546 A.2d 119, 122 (Pa. Super. 1988).
342. See supra notes 1-12,268-70 and accompanying text (discussing that case).
343. See Master Records, Inc. v. Backman, 652 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc)
(predating the enactment of the state's trade secrets act).
344. See Leo Publications, Inc. v. Reid, 458 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1995) (following
Multiple Reality, Inc. v. Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 139 S.E.2d 326, 328 (Ga. 1964), which
stated that a geographical, descriptive name is readily available to the public and belongs
to the public as a whole).
345. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912,921 (Ind. 1993).




lists have been discarded in a garbage receptacle rather than
shredded.37 Moreover, California courts have even found that a
company's unsuccessful marketing strategies may be "negative
research," valuable as having tested what not to pursue, and thus
entitled to protection 4 The Supreme Court of Iowa found that sales
and real estate lease information could be a trade secret if it had
economic value 49 -yet in Louisiana, a court found that a company's
profit and loss statements did not satisfy the state act's definition of a
trade secret .35  A Maine court held that a newly established
company's plan to purchase a piece of used equipment for less than
ten percent of the cost of a new machine and to enter the metal
vacuum coating business was not a trade secret because it was not
reasonably kept secret.351 In Ohio, general business information 352
and broad marketing concepts 353 are not protected as trade secrets,
but systems of manufacturing'l and sources of supply355 may be.
Finally, Wisconsin courts have held that information continuously
used in the operation of a business is a trade secret,356 yet the
information must be developed as an end in itself and not as a mere
by-product of the daily activities. 7
D. Relief
The fourth category of case law analyzed in Part III of this
Comment is how relief is granted or refused under the trade secrets
act in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions.358 Because monetary
recovery-either in lost profits, attorneys' fees, or in compensatory,
347. See Soap Co. v. Ecolab, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1366, 1372 (Ala. .1994) (Houston, J.,
concurring specially in part and dissenting in part) (stating in the dissent that the plaintiff
had failed to maintain the documents' secrecy).
348. Courtesy Temp. Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1278, 1287-88 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); accord Morton v. Rank Am., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1062, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
349. See U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Office of Consumer Advocate, 498 N.W.2d
711, 714-15 (Iowa 1993) (holding that the economic value was not proved).
350. See Autocount, Inc. v. Automated Prescription Systems, Inc., 651 So. 2d 308, 312
(La. Ct. App. 1995).
351. See Northeast Coating Techs., Inc. v. Vacuum Metallurgical Co., Ltd., 684 A.2d
1322, 1324 (Me. 1996).
352- See HCCT, Inc. v. Walters, 651 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (discussing
information about a hair styling salon).
353. See Richter v. Westlake, 529 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1976).
354. See, e.g., CPG Prod. Corp. v. Mego Corp, 214 U.S.P.Q. 206,213 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
355. See, e.g., Seifried v. Macox, 14 Ohio Dec. 536,540-42 (Super. Ct. 1904).
356. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 329 N.W.2d 178, 181-82
(Wis. 1983) (preceding the enactment of the state trade secrets act).
357. See Gary van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 267 N.W.2d 242,250 (Wis. 1978).
358. See infra notes 360-95 and accompanying text.
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nominal or punitive damages-is typically dictated by the precise
language in trade secrets acts, judicial interpretation of relief in this
Comment involves injunctive relief only." 9 The fact patterns of five
cases previously described illustrate best how relief is granted or
refused in North Carolina and are addressed below only in that
context. 60 Cases from other states largely echo the law in North
Carolina, which in essence allows injunctive relief where a plaintiff
can prove that a valuable, clearly identified, and narrowly defined
secret is being or will be misused.361 For a preliminary injunction, the
plaintiff must prove further that she is likely to succeed on the merits
of her case and that she would suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction. 62
Before its use will be enjoined, a trade secret must be clearly
defined, specifically identifiable, and valuable. In Merck, which
concerned marketing information for Pepcid (R) AC, the court
declared that a threatened misappropriation of information based on
a former employee's inevitable disclosure can be enjoined where the
injunction is limited to protecting trade secrets that are specifically
defined, clearly identified, and of significant value.363 The plaintiffs
had shown that the projected launch dates and marketing for the drug
were competitively valuable information, not generally known, and
sufficient to enjoin disclosure by the former employee to his new
employer, a major pharmaceutical competitor.3 4 Moreover, the court
held that the injunction urged by the plaintiffs was sufficiently narrow
where the plaintiffs produced evidence of the precise nature of at
least some of the information they claimed was a trade secret and
only sought to prevent the employee from working on a particular
competitor's product.3
Additionally, a party moving for a preliminary injunction must
prove that it is likely to succeed on the merits of the case and that
359. See supra note 15. The state acts do not instruct courts on granting injunctions but
may provide direction with regard to some form of monetary recovery, such as attorneys'
fees. See id.
360. See infra notes 363-79 and accompanying text.
361. See infra notes 380-95 and accompanying text (providing the law in other states).
362- See infra notes 366-70 and accompanying text (providing North Carolina's law on
preliminary injunctions).
363. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996). The court
continued that a showing of bad faith or underhanded dealing by the former employee or
new employer is not a necessary prerequisite under the doctrine. See id.
364. See id. at 1461. However, the fact that the plaintiffs did not seek a non-





without the injunction it would suffer irreparable harm. 6 For
instance, the plaintiff in Consolidated Textiles had moved under the
NCTSPA for a temporary restraining order and both a preliminary
and permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from further
divulging trade secrets. 67 The trial court allowed the temporary
order and later granted the preliminary injunction, finding a
substantial likelihood that the defendant had or would breach an
agreement not to contact certain customers.3 The court issued the
injunction because the defendant could maintain financial security by
contacting other customers .1 9 The two-pronged test for whether a
court could exercise its sound discretion in issuing a preliminary
injunction is: (1) whether the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success
on the merits, and (2) whether the plaintiff would sustain an
irreparable loss without an injunction, even if the loss might occur
during litigation.37
Generally, where a potential misappropriator has not given signs
that he will misuse secret information, he will not be enjoined from
using it without a showing of underhandedness. FMC, which involved
battery-quality lithium products, held that an employee will not be
enjoined from working for the competitor under the doctrine of
"inevitable discovery" unless the employee acts in an underhanded
manner or is employed by a technologically inferior business where
misappropriation can be inferred.371  The inevitable discovery
366. See infra notes 367-70 and accompanying text.




370. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 686; see also Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy,
802 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (expressing that an injunction may not issue
without a showing of imminent harm from the defendant's misuse, quoting from the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court),
aff'd sub nom. Amariglio-Dunn v. McCoy, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993). A loss during
litigation could occur where, for instance, litigants argue whether a purported trade secret
is generally known to a certain industry and, through the courtroom litigation, vital
information becomes public knowledge for all industry competitors to hear even though it
had not been publicly known previously. See supra notes 172-74 and infra notes 374-76
(describing the plaintiff's loss during litigation in Glaxo).
371. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1483 (W.D.N.C.
1995). The court stated also that the plaintiff had failed to show a likelihood of
irreparable harm to justify injunctive relief, for even if the plaintiff were harmed, the
NCTSPA affords a wide range of relief including royalties, actual and punitive damages,
and attorneys' fees. See id. For this case, the court said, those calculations were not
impossible. See id. When only two corporations share any market, the loss to one will be
evident in its dip in market share and will be fairly easy to link to the proliferation of its
technology, the court reasoned. See id.
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doctrine asserts that an employee who has certain valuable
knowledge will inevitably use it when working for the competitor 7
The court in FMC rejected it primarily because the employee said he
had no intention of revealing secret information about his old
employer to his new one, and no evidence was offered to suggest
otherwise.373
In some cases, a plaintiff may feel reluctant to litigate the loss of
her trade secret for fear of further dissemination as the information
becomes publicly available in the courtroom. The court in Glaxo
discussed the policies underlying the ancillary relief of protecting
trade secrets during litigation.374 The court stated that discussions of
particular "real" secrets obviously should be avoided in courts so as
not to subvert the plaintiff's objective in bringing suit.375 That
statement was balanced, however, with a warning that protective
steps taken in court should be narrowly tailored in order to avoid
"needlessly encroach[ing] upon the strong public interest in
maintaining open courts.
'3 76
Finally, North Carolina allows a party to recover under the
unfair and deceptive trade practices act if an NCTSPA violation also
satisfies the elements of that statute-a rule announced in
Drouillard.37 After the former employee had misled his replacement
by suggesting that he make a bid for an account that was sufficiently
high for him to underbid it at his new employment, the former
employer advanced claims for unfair and deceptive trade practices as
372. See id. at 1482.
373. See id. at 1483.
374. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1299 (E.D.N.C. 1996), affd,
110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
375. See id.; cf. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)
("[C]ourts have refused to permit their files to serve... as sources of business information
that might harm a litigant's competitive standing.").
376. Glaxo, 931 F. Supp. at 1299; see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 (delineating the
scope of public access to judicial records); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78
(3d Cir. 1988) (affirming the existence of a common law right to inspect judicial records);
Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984)
(explaining that the public's right to monitor the courts ensures quality, honesty, and
respect for the legal system).
377. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1994); Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper
Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992). The Unfair Competition
Act states that unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce are unlawful. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1994). "Commerce" includes all business activities other
than professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession. See § 75-1.1(b).
An express exception for professions involving the dissemination of advertisements is
included, see § 75-1.1(c), and any party claiming such an exemption has the burden of
proof. See § 75-1.1(d).
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well as misappropriation of trade secrets. The court held that the
former employer would be entitled to relief under the unfair trade
practice act if a NCTSPA violation satisfied the statutory test.379
Other states are generally in accord with the law evinced by the
foregoing North Carolina cases. They too require specificity, value,
and narrowness of a trade secret before it will be enjoined, and then
do so only if the plaintiff also has a strong case on the merits and will
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.380 A few states have
set out general tests paralleling the guidelines set by the court in
Merck.381 For example, Georgia's four-step test requires the plaintiff
to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a threat of
irreparable injury, that the threatened injury is weightier than any
harm to the defendant, and that an injunction will not frustrate the
public interest.3" Connecticut's test for the granting of a preliminary
injunction requires a "sufficiently. serious question on the merits"
coupled with a "balance of hardships," inquiring as to Which party's
position is graver, tipping decidedly in the former employer's favor.
On the question of balancing hardships, a Delaware court said it
should consider the effect an injunction will have on unrepresented
third parties and on the public generallyY 4
Most commentaries from other state courts address the type of
harm that may result from not issuing an injunction, which was
stressed in Consolidated Textiles s5  For example, in California,
injunctive relief is proper in order to eliminate a commercial
advantage that might result from the misappropriation of a trade
secret but only as long as the trade secret is vital.386  Colorado has
37& See Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 170,423 S.E.2d at 325.
379. See id. at 172,423 S.E.2d at 326.
380. See infra notes 381-95 and accompanying text (providing other states' laws on
injunctions).
381. See supra notes 363-65 and accompanying text (explaining Merck's guidelines).
382. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Reed Indus., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1211 (N.D. Ga. 1988). In fact,
some courts will provide injunctive relief even when the plaintiff does not request or try to
prove the need for it. See Universal Stampings, Inc. v. Plexus Indus., Inc. 439 N.W.2d 644,
644 (Wis. 1989).
383. Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D. Conn. 1996).
384. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Consistent Asset Management Co., No. 8867, 1987
WL 8459, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1987). Many other states include this consideration.
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1054 (4th Cir.
1985) (applying Virginia law); American Elec. v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1324 (Miss.
1988).
385. See supra notes 367-70 and accompanying text (discussing that case).
386. See Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34,53 n.21 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (quoting a section of the civil code that authorized an injunction); see also ABBA
Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that actual or
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expressed that a preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy"
to be used "sparingly, if at all" 3s7 and that a showing of irreparable
harm is perhaps the most important precondition for its issuance.388
By the same token, one of Illinois's threshold requirements for an
injunction is that no other remedy at law would suffice to correct the
alleged misappropriation of trade secrets.8 9
Some state courts have addressed other issues related to requests
for injunctions, ranging from the appropriate scope of the'injunction
to the suitable burden of proof. Whereas New York's state
legislature recently clarified its relevant law,390 nine states have not
heard judicial comment on the law of injunctions with regard to trade
secrets.39' Massachusetts law provides that the scope of an injunction
depends on a comparative appraisal of all the facts of a case, where
reasonableness is to be determined from those facts.39 Courts in New
Jersey, when determining the length of an injunction, are interested in
the savings in research development costs to another corporation and
the time it would take to develop the same secrets without resort to
the protected information. 393 The Louisiana Court of Appeals found
that injunctive relief under that state's trade secrets act did not apply
to discovery in civil actions and allowed a former employee to be used
as an expert witness against his corporation.3 9 In Nebraska, the
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets may be enjoined).
387. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 (D. Colo. 1995).
38& See Bishop & Co. v. Cuomo, 799 P.2d 444,447 (Colo. App. 1990).
389. See IDS Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Smithson, 843 F. Supp. 415, 419-20 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(holding that a former employer had demonstrated that it was at an economic advantage
by having secret information that its former employee copied before leaving and, upon
losing the information, the harm would be irreparable).
390. See Independent Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Murray, 649 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617-18 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996). New York's civil trade secrets act is the only one not codified in a single
act or chapter. See supra note 15.
391. The states are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
South Carolina, and West Virginia. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 24-25, 247-48,
258-59, 415, 557,585, 630, 817-18, 936.
392. See Jillian's Billiard Club, Inc. v. Beloff Billiards, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993). Massachusetts does not have a civil trade secrets act. See supra note 15.
393. See, eg., Raven v. A. Klein & Co., Inc., 478 A.2d 1208, 1211 (N.J. App. Div. 1984).
Texas has granted perpetual permanent injunctions, however. See, e.g., Molex. Inc, v.
Nolen, 759 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law to grant the perpetual
permanent injunction); Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174,
1180 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law to issue the same); American Precision Vibrator
Co. v. National Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (applying
Texas law to grant the perpetual permanent injunction).
394. See Stork-Werkspoor Diesel V.V. v. Koek, 534 So.2d 983, 985 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
But see Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 873 F. Supp. 1037, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 1994),
aff'd, No. 95-1130, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322, at *10 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (per
curiam, applying Michigan and Ohio law) (holding that an employee of the plaintiff's
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appellate court considers the factual questions surrounding injunction
actions de novo, and the plaintiff must prove every element by a
preponderance of the evidence.
39 5
In the four general areas explored above-how trade secrets are
defined, how misappropriation is proven, what types of items have
received trade secrets protection, and how remedies are granted-
North Carolina's ten cases molding law on the NCTSPA are
conceptually in accord with most of the law of other states.396 For
example, establishing the true secrecy of information to find a trade
secret or requiring irreparable harm for an injunction to issue are
fairly accepted legal tenets across America. A major deviation from
the UTSA's principles or a body of case law that significantly departs
from the general national trends might suggest a flaw in the
NCTSPA. Indeed, assuming trade secrets law is generally a sound
legal construct, this Comment asserts that the NCTSPA is not flawed
based on the absence of a fundamental difference in how the
NCTSPA operates and the similarity between North Carolina's and
other state courts' treatment of trade secrets law.397 Because research
identified no crucial discrepancy in North Carolina, either with regard
to the language of its trade secrets act or its resulting case law, this
Comment looks to other reasons that might explain its lack of
visibility in published opinions. The next logical step in the
examination is to study non-competition covenants in North Carolina,
which achieve a result similar to trade secrets protection and are the
subject of litigation in far more published opinions.3 9
IV. NON-COMPETITION COVENANTS IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN
ALTERNATE LEGAL SOLUTION
The sheer abundance of published opinions on covenants not to
compete in North Carolina and relative absenteeism of NCTSPA
cases raises the question of whether parties choose to litigate trade
could be permanently enjoined from testifying as an expert witness against his own
corporation).
395. See Richdale Dev. Co. v. McNeil Co., 508 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Neb. 1993), modified
by 510 N.W. 312 (Neb. 1994); Selection Research, Inc. v. Murman, 433 N.W.2d 526,531-33
(Neb. 1989). But see Mead Corp. v. Lane, 560 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ohio App. 1988)
(requiring clear and convincing evidence to enjoin a party in an Ohio trade secrets case).
396. See supra notes 121-395 and accompanying text (exploring those four areas of
trade secrets law).
397. Telephone interviews with leading trade secrets attorneys in North Carolina
support this conclusion. See infra notes 465-84 and accompanying text.
398. At least 52 published opinions since 1981 involve covenants not to compete.
Search of Westlaw, North Carolina Cases Library (April 8, 1999).
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secrets disputes more often as a contract breach than as a statutory
violation. An answer to that question requires a discussion of the
policies underlying trade secrets law to determine whether North
Carolina law on covenants not to compete is sufficiently similar to
provide the conceptual overlap required for alternateness 99 To be
sure, proving that trade secrets acts and actions on non-competition
covenants can be alternative legal options provides only the
foundation for an argument that trade secrets claims are litigated as
contract disputes rather than violations of the Act. Additional
support for the argument is available by asking practicing trade
secrets attorneys their views on whether one body of law is more
promising or favorable for obtaining a remedy. These views are
documented in Part V.O
States adopting the UTSA have implicitly espoused the policy
that was its genesis. According to the Commissioners' Comments to
the UTSA, the maintenance of commercial ethics standards is one of
the underlying premises behind trade secrets law. 01 Prior to the
drafting of the UTSA, however, courts decided trade secrets cases on
theories ranging from implied contract breach or unjust enrichment
to property or tort law. The contract theory is that the trade secret
owner has disclosed information to another in confidence, with the
implied or express agreement that the beneficiary may not divulge the
knowledge to anyone else or for any other market or purpose.4°2 The
property view is that the plaintiff's exclusive use of and right to
exclude others from his intellectual property has been infringed. This
is a credible notion given that property rights may exist in intangibles
yet be inadequate because courts usually consider the relationship of
the parties as an important indicator of a breach of confidence.4t 3 The
399. See infra notes 419-64 and accompanying text (summarizing North Carolina law
on covenants not to compete).
400. See infra notes 465-84 and accompanying text (presenting the attorneys' views).
401. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
402. Indeed, trade secret theory includes the property right to exclude others from
wrongful possession. See HENRY H. PERRrIT, JR., TRADE SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 1 (1994) [hereinafter PERRrJT]. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
confidential information acquired by a corporation in the course of business is the
corporation's exclusive property to be protected by courts through injunctions or by other
means. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (citation omitted);
PERRITr, supra, at 5-6. The limitation on the contract theory is that only the parties to the
agreement are bound, and gaps in privity will defeat a claim. See id. at 6-7. For instance,
in a non-contractual setting where negotiations fall through but during which confidence
has been exchanged, the contract view of trade secrets law will not provide a remedy that
justice requires.
403. See PERRrITr, supra note 402, at 7-9. Professor Milgrim argues that the concept of
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tort theory is that a breach of confidence under trade secrets law
should be interpreted as an embryo tort, analogous to conversion or
trespass, so that liability lies in common law damages as of right with
the additional possibility of equitable relief.' Another more obscure
interpretation is the confidential relationship view, which emphasizes
only the secrecy without regard to the content of the secret matter.
40 5
Regardless of the proper conceptual framework for classifying
trade secrets law, the Restatement of Torts undoubtedly was the
leading reference on trade secrets law nationwide prior to the
UTSA.4 6 Unfortunately, it did not address all of the issues that arose




Recognizing these inadequacies, as well as the conceptual problems
mentioned above, the Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted the
a trade secret begins with a property view; he draws analogies between the loss of a trade
secret when it is divulged and the loss of a tract of land through adverse possession. See 2
ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01[2], at 2-10 (1999). Recent cases
support Professor Milgrim's argument. See, e.g., Imed Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs., 602
So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) (explaining that trade secrets involve individual property
rights); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 711-12 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (characterizing a trade secret as property to determine whether it was
privileged); American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057, 1057 (Miss. 1987) (finding a
security interest in the property right of a trade secret, and deciding that information was
discoverable even though the trade secret was involved in a wrongful death case against a
tobacco company).
404. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1998) [hereinafter POOLEY];
Richard H. Stem, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After
Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927, 937-38 (1974); see also Union Carbide Corp. v.
Tarancon Corp., 742 F. Supp. 1565, 1580 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (intimating the tort
characterization because a special relationship between the parties created liability rather
than willfullness, akin to vicarious liability in tort or liability to those injured on the
premises of another, where the relationship is key). However, the Union Carbide case
also represents a property view in that it eliminates an actual fault requirement. See
PERRITT, supra note 402, at 8 n.15. See generally GALE R. PETERSON, TRADE SECRET
PROTECTION IN AN INFORMATION AGE 4-3 to 4-31 (1997) [hereinafter PETERSON]
(delineating the nature of the trade secrets right as either a property right or a tortious
breach of faith).
405. See PERmrT, supra note 402, at 7; Den-Tal-Ez Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566
A.2d 1214, 1228 (Pa. Super Ct. 1989) (stating that Pennsylvania law under Van Prods. Co.
v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 780 (Pa. 1965), rejects Justice
'Holmes's confidential relations view). Holmes's view is illustrated by E.L DuPont de
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), in which he stated that the starting
point for a trade secrets case is an assessment of a confidential relationship between the
parties and not the property at issue or concerns about the due process of law. See E.I.
DuPont, 244 U.S. at 102.
406. See POOLEY, supra note 404, § 2.02 [1].
407. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939); Ramon A. Klitzke, The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 306-09 (1080) (discussing the statute of
limitations).
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entire field of trade secrets law.4 °8 Its drafters considered trade
secrets law an independent body of law, and this further supported a
need to unify the law under a common rule.40 9 Consistent among
trade secrets cases was the idea that an entrepreneur's interest in her
private, valuable knowledge deserves protection, a notion that is the
oldest strain of intellectual property protection.1 State judges
created the law on trade secrets, which served those whose ideas were
not patented,411 whereby liability was premised on misconduct rather
than ownership of the secret and arose when an individual
misappropriated information.412 With this background, the UTSA
was drafted.413
Two main limitations to the law of trade secrets exist under both
the UTSA and common law. First, the protection disappears when
the protected knowledge is released unless the disclosure is restricted
contractually.4  Second, under the UTSA, only malfeasants are
forbidden from having the trade secret.415 In North Carolina, the
408. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS 1 (1965).
409. See id.; Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 378, 380-81 (1971). Trade secrets law is indeed a class of tort law, however.
See PERRrrr, supra note 402, at 1. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,
published by the American Law Institute in 1995, proposes that a trade secret is property,
but that misappropriation triggers court intervention. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995). The legal root of trade secrets protection is probably
less important than its broad implications, which fill the gaps between the narrower fields
such as patent law and center on the "prevailing public policy in fair dealing in business
relationships." ARTHUR H. SEIDEL & DAVID R. CRICHTON, WHAT THE GENERAL
PRACrrrIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENTS 12-13 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter SEIDEL & CRICHTON]; see also
PETERSON, supra note 404, at 2-16 (stating that the definitions and comments in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition probably will not have much effect on the law
in states that have adopted the UTSA).
410. See 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOLIES §§ 14.01-.05 (Altman rev. ed. 1982); PERRrIT, supra note 402, at 1. The
drawback is that innovations can be "locked up," undermining competition and
technological advancement, a side effect that the patent system averts. See PERRITT,
supra note 402, at 1.
411. The first cases in the United States were Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322 (1859),
and Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), cited in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 492 n.23 (1974). Like patents, however, trade secrets law protects the idea
conjuring the physical invention rather than the invention itself. See PERRrrr, supra note
402, at 1.
412. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment a; 2 CALLMANN, supra
note 410, at § 14.01. However, the legal interest attaches automatically, with a broad
scope, except that it allows independent innocent discovery of the same knowledge. See
PERRrITr, supra note 402, at 1.
413. See Root & Blynn, supra note 13, at 828-29.
414. See PERnrrr, supra note 402, at 1.
415. See id.
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second restriction has been lifted, for the NCTSPA does not require
wrongful conduct on the part of the individual who takes the trade
secret in order to establish liability.416 Nevertheless, those two
limitations apply to almost every other trade secrets case in America.
Trade secrets law also necessarily requires courts to make at least
two policy decisions. First, a court must draw a line to differentiate
between the fruits of an employment experience that an employee
may transfer to the next job and the information an employee learns
at work that remains the intellectual property of the employer
because it was disclosed to the employee in confidence.4 17 Another
policy choice centers on the degree to which a trade secret holder
should escape liability on the ground that he contributed something
new to the innovative knowledge.418
Despite the availability of the NCTSPA, research on trade
secrets in North Carolina reveals that the vast majority of cases may
be couched as contract actions, because often the absence of a
covenant not to compete will be mentioned in a trade secrets case.419
For protection, businesses often request that some of their employees
sign contracts in which they promise not to divulge private, valuable
information-either expressly specified or generally assumed-both
during and subsequent to the employment relationship.42 Covenants
not to compete in North Carolina are governed by a state statute
providing that they must be in writing and signed by the person who
agrees not to compete.421 They will be enforced when they are
"reasonably necessary to protect the covenantee's business
416. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between
the NCrSPA and UTSA regarding improper conduct). Apparently, this distinction led a
limited number of observers to exclude North Carolina from their lists of states adopting
the UTSA. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 404, at 2-9 to 2-10 n.10 (1997); SEIDEL &
CRICHTON, supra note 409, at 181. But see ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 677 (stating
that North Carolina "adopted its version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act").
417. See PERnrrr, supra note 402, at 16.
418. See id.
419. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1461 (M.D.N.C. 1996); FMC
Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1482 (W.D.N.C. 1995). For older
commentary on covenant-not-to-compete law in North Carolina, see John Reid Parker,
Jr., Injunctive Russian Roulette and Employment Noncompetition Cases: AEP Indus., Inc.
v. McClure, 63 N.C. L. REV. 222, 222-40 (1984); W. Thomas Roy, Covenants Not to
Compete, 38 N.C. L. REV. 395,395-403 (1959-60).
420. For a summary of American law on covenants not to compete, including particular
differences in Alabama, California, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Texas, see JERRY
COHEN & ALAN S. GUTrERMAN, TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION
165-85 (1998).
421. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1994).
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interest."4' The two distinct, legitimate circumstances where
restrictive covenants 423 may be enforced in an employment
relationship are when the employee will have personal contact with
the employer's customers or when the employee must acquire
valuable knowledge about the nature and character of the business.
424
Indeed, one of the principal purposes of a non-competition contract is
to protect the relationship between an employer and its customers,
4 2
although the interests requiring such protection need not be trade
secrets.4 6
To be enforceable, courts have said a covenant not to compete in
North Carolina must be written,427 "reasonable as to time and
territory,"' incorporated in the employment contract, supported by
valuable consideration,429 and "designed to protect a legitimate
business interest of the employer."430 Some courts also include the
requirement that the covenant not contravene public policy. 431
422. Beasley v. Banks, 90 N.C. App. 458, 460, 368 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1988) (citation
omitted).
423. The term "restrictive covenant" denotes a "covenant not to compete" or a "non-
competition covenant" for purposes of this Comment.
424. See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 650-51, 370 S.E.2d 375, 380
(1988) (citing A.E.P. Indus. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 408, 302 S.E.2d 754, 763 (1983);
Asheville Assocs. v. Berman, 255 N.C. 400,403, 123 S.E.2d 593,595 (1981)).
425. See Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 117 N.C. App. 307,311-12,450 S.E.2d
912, 917 (1994).
426. See Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 120, 124-25,392 S.E.2d 446,449 (1990).
The Young court explained that "customers developed by an employee" belong to the
employer and merit protection through a covenant not to compete. Id. (citing Whittaker
Gen. Medical Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523,379 S.E.2d 824 (1989)); United Labs, 322 N.C.
at 652, 370 S.E.2d at 382.
427. See Young, 99 N.C. App. at 122-23, 392 S.E.2d at 448 (1990) (citing A.E.P. Indus.
v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 403-04, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760-61 (1983)); Hartman v. W.H. Odell
& Assocs., Inc., 117 N.C. App. 307,311, 450 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1994).
428. Young, 99 N.C. App. at 122-23,392 S.E.2d at 448 (1990).
429. See id.
430. Id.
431. See Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 101 N.C. App. 341, 344, 399 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1991)
(holding covenant unenforceable as against public policy); Triangle Leasing Co. v.
McMahon, 96 N.C. App. 140, 147,385 S.E.2d 360,365-66 (1989) (holding that enforcement
of a covenant barring competition in vehicle leasing and rental throughout the entire state
was against public policy); Whittaker Gen. Medical Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523,528,379
S.E.2d 824, 828 (1989) (noting that the unreasonable portion of the contract may be
removed if it is separable); Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 685,
220 S.E.2d 190 (1975) (including the policy consideration as a requirement for a valid
covenant); Wilmar, Inc. v. Corsillo, 24 N.C. App. 271, 275, 210 S.E.2d 427, 433 (1974)
(stating that a salesman's employment contract prohibiting competition within the
territory he had sold employer's goods for one year after leaving was not injurious to the
public); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Griffin, 258 N.C. 179, 181, 128 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1962)
(same); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 159, 29 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1944) (declaring that
covenant was unenforceable because it contravened public policy).
[Vol. 772204
TRADE SECRETS
Regarding the public policy condition, the courts have said that when
a contract is defective and attempts to stifle normal competition, the
public's interest in preserving one's "ability to earn a living" exceeds
the interest in protecting employers from competition.43 If the
covenant is truly part of the overall agreement, it must be agreed
upon at the same time and as part of the contract of employment,433
and if the covenant comes later, a new exchange of consideration is
required for it to be valid.434
In North Carolina, the signing of a covenant not to compete at
the time of hiring provides sufficient consideration to support the
contract.435 In fact, even if the covenant is part of an original verbal
employment contract, it will be considered to have valuable
consideration.43 6 As long as the covenant is agreed upon at that time,
it may be executed in writing after the employee begins work;
otherwise, additional consideration is required.437 A change in the
terms and conditions of employment, such as a raise in salary or a
new job assignment, will provide adequate consideration to support a
covenant not to compete that is formed after the employment has
432. Electrical S. v. Lewis, 96 N.C. App. 160, 165, 385 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (quoting
Kadis, 224 N.C. at 159,29 S.E.2d at 546). For the medical profession, the following factors
are considered: the shortage of specialists in the field in the restricted area; the plaintiff's
impact in establishing a monopoly of a particular practice in the area, including the impact
of fees in the future and the constant availability of an emergency doctor; and the public
interest in having a choice in selecting a physician. See Statesville Medical Group P.A. v.
Dickey, 106 N.C. App., 669, 673-74, 418 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1992) (citing Iredell Digestive
Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21,30-31,373 S.E.2d 449,454-55 (1985), affd, 324
N.C. 327,377 S.E.2d 750 (1989)). Additionally, courts have considered whether a restraint
would interfere with a patient's ability to obtain multiple opinions. See id.
433. See Statesville Medical, 106 N.C. App. at 672, 418 S.E.2d at 258 (quoting Iredell
Digestive Disease Clinic, 92 N.C. App. at 26, 373 S.E.2d at 452).
434. See Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 111 N.C. App. 866, 869, 433 S.E.2d 811, 813-14
(1993).
435. See id. (involving covenants created subsequent to hiring); Safety Equip. Sales &
Serv. v. Williams, 22 N.C. App. 410,413,206 S.E.2d 745,748 (1974) (same).
436. See Young v. Mastrom, Inc. 99 N.C. App. 120, 123, 392 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1990)
(deciding that three covenants were not part of the employee's original verbal contracts);
see also Stevenson v. Parsons, 96 N.C. App. 93, 97,384 S.E.2d 291,293 (1989) (holding that
the terms of an oral covenant "must have been agreed upon at the time of employment" in
order for later execution to be enforceable without some consideration other than
employment); Robbins & Weil v. Mason, 70 N.C. App. 537, 542, 320 S.E.2d 693, 694
(1984) (finding that a non-competition covenant formed at the time of hiring and as part
of the employment contract was supported by valuable consideration, even where the
covenant was not executed in writing until later).
437. See Young, 99 N.C. at 123,392 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Stevenson, 96 N.C. App. at 97,
384 S.E.2d at 293); see also Seaboard Indus. v. Blair, 10 N.C. App. 323, 333, 178 S.E.2d
781, 787 (1971) (holding that the covenant was part of the original contract of
employment, even though the signing of a written agreement was delayed in order for the
employee to participate in a more favorable stock option plan).
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begun.43 Modifying an employee's method of compensation from
straight salary to base-plus-incentive will suffice, but the change must
be linked to the employee's signing the covenant.439 The changes
must not be illusory44 or conditioned on an improved economy,441 but
they need not be stated in writing.442
A North Carolina court will consider various factors in
determining whether the temporal and geographic restrictions in a
covenant are reasonable, and the interrelatedness of those restrictions
allows a court to offset one against the other to determine
reasonableness. 43 The restrictions must be no broader in scope than
necessary to protect the employer's business from losing customers,
43& See Worth Chem. Corp. v. Freeman, 261 N.C. 780,781, 136 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1964)
(per curiam) (cited in Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523, 527, 379 S.E.2d
824, 827 (1989) (finding that an employee's promotion, salary increase, and automobile
allowance, all given at the time she signed the covenant not to compete, were sufficient
consideration)); cf Young, 99 N.C. App. at 123, 392 S.E.2d at 448 (holding that covenants
that had been discussed vaguely, if at all, during interviews, were unsupported by
consideration where the employees received no salary increase or other benefit for signing
them four days after being hired); Collier Cobb & Assocs. v. Leak, 61 N.C. App. 249, 253,
300 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1983) (stating that no consideration supported covenants that were
signed by employees who had worked twenty-two years and three months, respectively,
before being asked to sign them and who did not receive increased pay or a change in
duties); Mastrom, Inc. v. Warren, 18 N.C. App. 199, 202, 196 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1973)
(finding that a promise to pay additional compensation in the future was illusory and did
not comprise consideration for a non-competition covenant that was signed after the
employee had begun work and had not changed job responsibilities).
Continued employment will not provide sufficient consideration. See Forrest
Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 687, 220 S.E.2d 190, 196 (1975) (citation
omitted); Young, 99 N.C. App. at 123, 392 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261
N.C. 166,168,134 S.E.2d 166,167 (1964)).
439. See Young, 99 N.C. App. at 124,392 S.E.2d at 448.
440. See id. (finding that the employer's promise involving unspecific changes in the
method of compensation, expense reimbursements, and vacation and sick leave, all to be
in the discretion of the Board of Directors, were illusory). The Young court also stated
that changing a provision from stating that 30 days' notice "shall be given" by the
employee before leaving to "may be given" did not afford the employee one month of
extra pay, especially where the employer did not pay it. Id. at 124. Moreover, the court
rejected an employer's claim that consideration for a covenant not to compete was
supplied by the alteration of the type of employment from at-will to term, since the
paragraph stating that either party "may" terminate the contract on 30 days' notice was
essentially a severable notice provision giving consideration only to that paragraph. See
id.
441. See Milner v. Airco, Inc., 111 N.C. App. 866,870,433 S.E.2d 811,813,814 (1993).
442. See Brooks Distrib. Co. v. Pugh, 324 N.C. 326, 326, 378 S.E.2d 31, 31 (1989) (per
curiam) (affirming the court of appeals dissent, Brooks Distrib. Co. v. Pugh, 91 N.C. App.
715, 722, 373 S.E.2d 300, 305 (1988) (Cozort, J., dissenting in part), that accepted
consideration not in writing).
443. See Jewel Box Stores v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 665, 158 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1968)
(citation omitted) (quoted in Triangle Leasing v. McMahon, 96 N.C. App. 140, 149, 385
S.E.2d 360,365 (1989), affd in part, rev'd inpart, 327 N.C. 224,393 S.E.2d 854 (1990)).
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which is measured by considering the type of position the employee
had and the skills or knowledge he or she obtained under
employment.4" The party seeking enforcement of the covenant not
to compete has the burden to prove that its terms are reasonable.445
Regarding a time restriction, one North Carolina court has stated
that a five-year period running from the date of termination could be
justified only by extreme conditions and that a covenant that could
last for more than five years was "patently unreasonable." 446 Several
promises not to compete for two years or fewer have been held to be
reasonable. 447 As for geography, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in 1994 stated that for a limitation to be reasonable an
employer must show where its customers are located and that the
boundary in the covenant is necessary to maintain those customer
relationships."4  If the territory encompassed is broader than
necessary to secure the protection of the business or goodwill, then
the entire covenant fails because equity refuses to enforce or reform
an overreaching covenant." 9 The six factors to consider are: (1) the
444. See Manpower v. Hedgecock, 42 N.C. App. 515, 521-22, 257 S.E.2d 109, 114-15
(1979) (citation omitted).
445. See Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 117 N.C. App. 307, 311, 450 S.E.2d
912, 916 (1994) (holding that the former employer failed to satisfy its burden); Hartwell
Enter., Inc. v. Heim, 6 N.C. App. 548,552, 170 S.E.2d 540,543 (1969), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 376 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970).
446. Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 317, 450 S.E.2d at 918-19. But see Welcome Wagon
Int'l v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 250, 120 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1961) (allowing a five-year
covenant in the city where the employee had worked and stating that restrictive covenants
have been approved for periods ranging from one to twenty years).
447. See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 656, 370 S.E.2d 375, 388
(1988), rev'g on this issue, 87 N.C. App. 296, 361 S.E.2d 292 (1987) (lasting one and a half
years); Keith v. Day, 81 N.C. App. 185,194,343 S.E.2d 562,567 (1986) (lasting two years);
Amdar, Inc. v. Satterwhite, 37 N.C. App. 410, 416, 246 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (lasting one
year); Forrest Paschal Mach. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 682, 220 S.E.2d 190, 197
(1975) (lasting two years); Safety Equip. Sales & Serv. v. Williams, 22 N.C. App. 410, 414,
206 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1974) (lasting two years).
448. See Hartman, 117 N.C. App. At 316, 450 S.E.2d at 917 (quoting Manpower, 42
N.C. App. at 523,257 S.E.2d at 115 (1979)).
449. See Hartnan, 450 S.E.2d at 917 (quoting A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 308 N.C.
393, 408, 302 S.E.2d 754, 763 (1983), and Beasley v. Banks, 90 N.C. App. 458, 460, 368
S.E.2d 885,886 (1988)). The court in Whittaker Gen. Medical Corp. v. Daniel expanded on
this idea:
If a contract by an employee in restraint of competition is too broad to
be a reasonable protection to the employer's business it will not be
enforced. The courts will not rewrite a contract if it is too broad but will
simply not enforce it. If the contract is separable, however, and one part is
reasonable the courts will enforce the reasonable provision.
Whittaker, 324 N.C. at 528, 379 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (holding
that the covenant provision which employer sought to enforce was separable from the
allegedly over-broad provision which the employer did not attempt to enforce, and was
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area or scope of the restriction; (2) the area assigned to the employee;
(3) the area where the employee actually worked or was subject to
work; (4) the area in which the employer operated; (5) the nature of
the business involved; and (6) the nature of the employee's duty and
his knowledge of the employer's business operation.5 If the key
issue in litigation is the employee's knowledge of the customers, the
territory should be carved to the areas in which the employee made
actual customer contacts.451 In fact, a court will allow a customer
restriction to substitute for or complement a geographic restriction.452
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction to enforce a
restrictive covenant, a plaintiff must show: (1) the likelihood of
success on the merits of the case; and (2) the likelihood of suffering
irreparable loss unless the injunction is issued.453 The employer
establishes a likelihood of success by making a prima facie showing of
the prerequisites to the enforceability of the covenant, namely the
reasonable and enforceable); see also Electrical S. v. Lewis, 96 N.C. App. 160, 165, 385
S.E.2d 352, 356 (1989) (declining to determine whether covenant had a grammatically
divisible portion that could be enforceable); Schultz & Assocs. of the S.E. v. Ingram, 38
N.C. App. 422, 429, 248 S.E.2d 345, 351 (1978) (finding divisible "areas of activity").
Compare Welcome Wagon Int'l v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 257, 120 S.E.2d 739, 748-49
(1961) (holding that a provision for a citywide restriction was reasonable, but that a
grammatically severable provision restricting competition in any American city or town
where the employer intends to do-business was not, and enforcing only the former), with
Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 96 N.C. App. 140, 147, 385 S.E.2d 360, 364 (1989)
(noting that the failure of the parties to make divisions of territory precluded a court of
equity from enforcing only the reasonable territorial restrictions).
450. See Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 316-17, 450 S.E.2d at 917.
451. See id. (quoting Manpower, 42 N.C. App. at 521,257 S.E.2d at 114).
452. See Whittaker, 324 N.C. at 526, 379 S.E.2d at 826 (1989) ("[Customers developed
by a salesperson are the property of the employer and may be protected by a contract
under which the salesperson is forbidden from soliciting those customers for a reasonable
time after leaving his or her employment.").
453. See A.E.P. Indus. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 401, 302 S.E.2d 754, 759-60 (1983)
(quoting Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 701, 239 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1977)); Nalle
Clinic Co. v. Parker, 101 N.C. App. 341, 343-44, 399 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1991); Iredell
Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 24-25, 373 S.E.2d 449, 450-51
(1988), affd, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1988). Only after the movant establishes its
likelihood of success may the court consider the plaintiffs position if an injunction were
denied. See Triangle Leasing, 96 N.C. App. at 146,385 S.E.2d 360 at 363 (citing Robins &
Weil v. Mason, 70 N.C. App. 537,540-41,320 S.E.2d 693,696 (1984)).
In order to establish a reasonable apprehension of irreparable injury, the plaintiff
must show a high likelihood of disclosure, a finding for which the court may consider "the
circumstances surrounding the termination of employment," the importance of the former
employee's job, the type of work performed, "the kind of information sought to be
protected," and the competitor's need for the information. See Masterclean of N.C. v.
Guy, 82 N.C. App. 45, 51, 345 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1986) (citation omitted). The trial court
must make specific findings of fact with respect to the harm that the former employer
seeks to avoid, and the record on appeal must reveal evidence to support that conclusion.
See Nalle Clinic, 101 N.C. App. at 345, 399 S.E.2d at 366.
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reasonableness of its temporal and territorial conditions.454 Or, the
court may issue an injunction if it deems its issuance necessary to
protect the plaintiff's rights during litigation.455 Furthermore, the
inclusion of a liquidated damages clause does not preclude injunctive
relief.56 The standard of review on appeal of a trial judge's decision
following a preliminary injunction hearing or on the enforcement of a
covenant not to compete is one of error, or de novo.457 A former
employer can obtain an injunction even if she dismissed the
employee,458 but a preliminary injunction is appealable if it deprives
the defendant of a substantial right that she would lose absent a
review prior to a final adjudication on the merits of the case.459
A review of the rules and principles of the law of covenants not
to compete in North Carolina reveals that its purpose is closely
aligned with the policy objectives underlying trade secrets law."6
Both legal tools aim to protect the creator or holder of valuable
information from the wrongful use by another, creating a substantial
conceptual overlap. That overlap is not complete, however, for trade
454. See Electrical S. v. Lewis, 96 N.C. App. 160, 165, 385 S.E.2d 352,355 (1989) (citing
A.E.P. Indus., 308 N.C. at 402-03, 302 S.E.2d at 761). If the covenant was made after
employment began and had insufficient consideration, a former employer does not have a
likelihood of success on the merits. See Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 111 N.C. App. 866,
868, 433 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1993) (dissolving a preliminary injunction enforcing covenants).
455. See Nalle Clinic, 101 N.C. App. at 343-44, 399 S.E.2d at 365; A.E.P. Indus., 308
N.C. at 401, 302 S.E.2d at 759-60 (1983) (quoting Investors, 293 N.C. at 701, 239 S.E.2d at
574); Iredell, 92 N.C. App. at 25,373 S.E.2d at 451.
456. See Iredell, 92 N.C. App. at 25, 373 S.E.2d at 451 (denying an injunction for public
policy reasons rather than for the presence of a liquidated damages clause).
457. See, e.g., Nalle Clinic, 101 N.C. App. at 345, 399 S.E.2d at 366; Statesville Medical
Group, P.A. v. Dickey, 106 N.C. App. 669, 672,418 S.E.2d 256,258 (1992) (quoting A.E.P.
Indus. and Iredell to explain that the appellate court is not "bound by the [trial court's]
findings, but may review and weigh evidence and find facts for itself' to determine
whether the plaintiff has met its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits).
Butsee Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 120, 122,392 S.E.2d 446,448 (1990) (stating
that "factual findings made in a nonjury trial have the force and effect of a jury verdict
and, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal" even in the face of
contrary evidence).
458. See Masterclean, 82 N.C. App. at 47, 345 S.E.2d at 694 (inferring that the
employer's firing the employee could have enforced the covenant not to compete had its
terms been reasonable). A court, however, presumably would observe the general rule
that a party will be excused from the obligation to perform if the other party committed
the first material breach. See Mills Constr. Co. v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley, 86 N.C. App.
506,513,358 S.E.2d 566,570 (1987).
459. See Masterclean, 82 N.C. App. at 47, 345 S.E.2d at 694; see also Milner Airco, 111
N.C. App. at 869,433 S.E.2d at 813 (concluding that the inability to do a seasonal business
during a particular affects a substantial right).
460. See supra notes 419-59 and accompanying text (describing North Carolina's law of
covenants not to compete).
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secrets law is not confined to employment applications, 6 and in the
same respect some restrictive covenant cases may not have trade
secrets implications. Nevertheless, the vast majority of trade secrets
cases originate from the employment relationship,462 and trade secrets
are found in all sorts of objects of dispute.43  Thus, the probability
that both legal claims could apply to the same case is very high. Thus
it is quite probable that many potential NCTSPA cases are couched
as contract actions, given their heightened visibility in published law.
Legal research provides a foundation for that argument but cannot
validate it. Consequently, this Comment solicits the views of North
Carolina's top trade secrets attorneys to verify the conclusion that a
contract action probably is the preferred legal option and to provide
any other ideas for why the NCTSPA has seldom appeared in judicial
opinions since its enactment in 1981.:6
V. TRADE SECRETS ATTORNEYS' VIEWS ON WHY THE NCTSPA
LACKS VISIBILITY
Several observers in North Carolina agree that the NCTSPA is
not flawed and is indeed effective, at least in straightforward cases. 65
461. For example, an unpublished and early trade secrets case on the NCrSPA, from
Orange County, enjoined a person posing as a student working on a research paper from
using, in a competing business, information he obtained in an interview with an officer of a
corporation. Telephone Interview with Susan Olive, Vice President and Member of Olive
& Olive, P.A., and chair of the North Carolina Intellectual Property Law Committee at
the time the NCTSPA was drafted (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Olive Interview]. Ms.
Olive has served several terms on the North Carolina General Statutes Commission. See
id.
462. See, e.g., ABA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 11-13, 23-24,35-38,53-60, 85-91, 123-30,
144-46, 171-76, 193-95, 208-10, 228-31, 244-47, 256-58, 286-300, 318-20, 338-42, 359-63, 373,
386-88, 410-14, 431-32, 447-49, 473-78, 503-09, 526-28, 540-45, 554-57, 572-74, 583-84, 595-
96, 609-11, 628-30, 655-63, 684-86, 699-700, 718-21, 738-41, 760-62, 779-82, 801-02, 816-17,
829-30, 839-40, 853-55, 871-73, 879-80, 895-97, 917-18, 935-36, 955-68, 978-79.
463. See supra notes 195-357 and accompanying text (providing a plethora of items and
subjects for which trade secrets have been claimed or established).
464. See infra notes 465-84 and accompanying text (providing the attorneys' views).
465. See Olive Interview, supra note 461 ("The Act is effective in black and white
cases."). She remarked also that employers usually win cases on the NCI'SPA. See id.; see
also Telephone Interview with William Rikard, Partner at Parker, Poe, Adams &
Bernstein, L.L.P. and five-time teacher of the continuing legal education course on trade
secrets (Oct. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Rikard Interview] (stating that the NCTSPA is
especially useful when the enforceability of a non-competition agreement is questionable);
Telephone Interview with Henry B. Ward III, Partner at Alston & Bird L.L.P., Charlotte
(Oct. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Ward Interview] (mentioning that he did not find a problem
with the Act the last time he dealt with it). But see Telephone Interview with Charles
Johnson, Partner at Kilpatrick, Stockton, Charlotte (Oct. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Johnson
Interview] (stating that the NCTSPA is not very effective in preventing competition and
that proving a violation is difficult unless, for instance, the stolen documents are
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To the best memory of the chairperson of the subcommittee that
drafted the NCTSPA and long-time member of the North Carolina
General Statutes Commission, not one letter requesting amendment
of the statute has been received.4 6  The most commonly litigated
issue in the cases, according to an attorney who has considerable
experience with the NCTSPA, is whether the alleged trade secret
could be known from sources other than the party claiming it.467 In
any case, the trade secrets question is seldom the subject of published
law, its visibility possibly obscured by the abundance of covenant not
to compete cases that seek the same objective for a client.46 Yet not
produced). Mr. Johnson stated that he once caught someone with twelve boxes of
drawings and formulae, and promptly recovered them for his client. See id. Mr. Johnson
believes that he and Mr. Rikard have handled a significant number of trade secrets cases
against each other. See id.
466. See Olive Interview, supra note 461 (noting that frequently an attorney will write a
letter requesting a change in a statute). Ms. Olive added that she thought the NCTSPA
was well written for terminating a business venture immediately-basically, that the
remedies are effective and sufficiently harsh-which is often the plaintiff's wish. See id.
Noting that companies "are not great about keeping secrets," she said that covenants not
to compete are valuable in cases where the secrecy of information is debatable. See id.
Knowledge can be very valuable even if not a secret-for example, information that can
be duplicated by collecting fifteen phone books. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with
Guy Blynn, Vice President of RJ. Reynolds and co-author of the only other law review
piece, see Root & Blynn, supra note 13, on the NCTSPA (Oct. 13, 1998) [hereinafter
Blynn Interview] (saying that the NCTSPA is not tougher than other acts for recovery, yet
one might assume it was because of the few written opinions about it).
467. See Johnson Interview, supra note 465. Mr. Johnson continued that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals decision finding customer lists to be trade secrets is often
challenged when cited in other cases because that case was not vigorously defended. See
id.; see also Rikard Interview, supra note 465 (stating that proving the existence of a trade
secret is a point of difficulty and that the case law is not consistent, for example, on
customer lists).
468. See Ward Interview, supra note 465. Mr. Ward clarified that the NCTSPA may
still be claimed in most trade secrets cases, but a contract claim will be pursued as primary
grounds for recovery if the facts in a specific case might not satisfy the statutory elements.
See id. Opting to sue on a contract rather than the statute might be an attempt by lawyers
either to avoid the dubious task of satisfying statutory elements, or to provide the judge
with something "concrete" upon which to rule, namely the contract. See Johnson
Interview, supra note 465. Mr. Johnson believes that the NCTSPA is less effective relief
than a contract because the statutory requirements are very difficult to establish. See id.
Mr. Rikard agrees with Mr. Johnson, but notes that covenants may not be enforceable,
forcing reliance on the Act. See Rikard Interview, supra note 465.
Mr. Johnson stated that suing on a non-competition agreement is preferred over
suing under the NCTSPA because the contract is something concrete to show the judge,
its breach is easier to establish, and the effect of injunctive relief is more severe-it blocks
the employment rather than ordering silence. See id.; see also Rikard Interview, supra
note 465 (stating that more covenant cases exist because a contract is more "clear-cut" and
can be appealed more easily). "The proof is the contract itself," Mr. Rikard said,
qualifying his remark by mentioning the legal restrictions governing covenants not to
compete. See id. He also stated that a trade secrets lawsuit might be cast as a breach of
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all businesses utilize non-competition agreements, so those employers
cannot rely on covenants not to compete in a trade secrets case.469
Some employment law practitioners have offered further insight
into why the NCTSPA is largely a hidden law. First, they agree that
the NCTSPA appears in several complaints but is not litigated
because most cases settle.470 One reason for settlement is that the
company receiving the alleged trade secrets fears an injunction.
471
Another reason to compromise is that trade secrets cases typically
involve a corporation suing an individual, where the defendant fears
financial ruin and the corporation could do without a monetary
award.472 Settlement may also occur because litigating trade secrets
cases is costly and unpleasant.473
Second, even if a case does not settle, in a practical sense it is
decided before trial, which obviates a published judicial opinion.474 If
fiduciary duty or unfair competition, which could avoid mention of the NCTSPA. See id.
Ms. Olive stated that the end results under a covenant not to compete and under the Act
are not very different and that "there is no gap in coverage that needs to be filled
[between the two legal devices]." See Olive Interview, supra note 461.
Mr. Blynn explained that major metropolitan areas are more apt to enforce
covenants, whereas North Carolina courts are loathe to enforce them, especially at non-
executive levels. See Blynn Interview, supra note 466. The reason, he said, is that North
Carolina judges are more receptive to arguments that, for instance, someone who has
spent years marketing cigarettes will not be skilled in marketing hair products. See id. He
said that judges remember themselves as former general practitioners in law, and recall
that they might not have been competent to handle specialized cases in an unfamiliar field.
See id. Mr. Blynn believes that judges in major cities are more commercially wise, and
would understand that most employees can switch jobs-while remaining in the same
general field-with ease. See id.
469. See Johnson Interview, supra note 465 (mentioning that the NCT SPA is discussed
when a corporation wants to silence a former employee, but no covenant was signed).
Statistics on the number of businesses utilizing non-competition agreements were not
found. Mr. Johnson said, however, that engineers and software and computer specialists
often will be hired even if they resist signing a covenant not to compete. See id. He
expressed surprise that physicians sign them so often and wondered whether they have
more market leverage than they think. See id. Mr. Johnson also mentioned that not every
state forbids lawyers from signing them, but North Carolina does. See id. According to
him, although some salespeople sign covenants not to compete, most general bankers and
middle managers do not. See id. More employers do not insist on the covenants, he
surmised, and some are unenforceable. See id.
470. See Johnson Interview, supra note 465; Ward Interview, supra note 465.
471. See Ward Interview, supra note 465.
472. See id.; Olive Interview, supra note 461 (noting that employees who are enjoined
are even less financially able to appeal because they are no longer profiting from the
information they acquired).
473. See Johnson Interview, supra note 465. Perhaps the least pleasant experience is
calling customers to testify in court for both parties. See id.
474. See Blynn Interview, supra note 466 (stating that, despite the many trade secrets
claims in complaints, they are often not in written opinions because preliminary injunction
hearings dispose of them). Ms. Olive recently handled three trade secrets cases, all of
2212 [Vol. 77
TRADE SECRETS
the trial judge enjoins the individual who misappropriated the
information from using it, that individual would either concede or
settle on other terms475 because proving damages is very difficult for a
plaintiff. If the plaintiff does not succeed in enjoining the defendant,
the information is released and the original aim for the lawsuit is
destroyed.476 Furthermore, any appeal on a trade secrets case is
difficult because the cases are fact-specific and appellate judges are
hesitant to disturb the factual findings made by a trial judge.' 7
A third reason for the dearth of cases may be simply that trade
secrets incidents occur less frequently than other types of intellectual
property disputes, such as copyright, patent, and trademark
infringement.478 In fact, one attorney thought that many of his
which were disposed of at the preliminary injunction hearing. See Olive Interview, supra
note 461.
475. For example, the parties might agree that the employee will work in the shipping
department for one year before starting work in the research laboratory. See Rikard
Interview, supra note 465.
476. Mr. Johnson believes that the NCTSPA is "often raised in litigation, but rarely
appealed." Johnson Interview, supra note 465. Mr. Rikard agrees. See Rikard Interview,
supra note 465. Mr. Johnson stated that one of three scenarios is likely: (1) the plaintiff
will get a temporary restraining order-which is easier to get in state court than federal
court and should be sought there even if diversity exists-at which time the case is over
because proving damages is so difficult; (2) the plaintiff is denied an injunction,
whereupon the plaintiff will abandon the case due to the many disincentives to appeal; or
(3) many plaintiffs lawyers encourage clients to settle a case to prevent disclosure of the
trade secret because the court will not prohibit an employee from working for the new
employer absent a contract. See Johnson Interview, supra note 465.
477. See Olive Interview, supra note 461. Contrast that with non-competition contract
cases, in which each party has an incentive to appeal. See id. She said in those cases the
employer has money, the employee has public policy on his or her side, and the cases are
cheaper. See id. Also, the appellate judge can construe the contract just as well as a trial
court judge can, so deference to the trial court is less pronounced. See id. Additionally,
the contract cases are simpler because sometimes the covenants will specify whether
information is a trade secret, which is "significant evidence" for a finding that such
information is or is not in fact a trade secret. See id.
478. See Ward Interview, supra note 465. During his three years at the firm, Mr. Ward
has handled less than five pure trade secrets cases, which he says is understandable given
that trademark, patent, and copyright claims are more powerful and certainly more
prevalent. See id. But see Olive Interview, supra note 461 (noting that some companies
opt not to patent their ideas because policing the patent can be difficult, particularly for
process or method patents-competitors may have "KEEP OUT" signs on the premises).
Mr. Blynn considers copyright law to be a more powerful remedy than the NCTSPA and
the preferred legal strategy. See Blynn Interview, supra note 466.
To understand how trade secrets law interacts with other forms of intellectual
property law, see MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN AND MCHAEL S. OSTRACH, TRADE SECRETS,
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS & OTHER SAFEGUARDS FOR PROTECTING BUSINESS
INFORMATION (1986). Mr. Blynn listed four general fact patterns where trade secrets
policies arise. See Blynn Interview, supra note 466. First are cases involving thieves, who
outright steal information, for example, by electronic eavesdropping. See id. These cases
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colleagues were unfamiliar with the NCSPA and believed that
others might consider a client whose employee had misappropriated
information to be without recourse if no covenant in the employment
contract existed.4 79 Regardless, more than one attorney interviewed
mentioned that lawyering in trade secrets practice requires more
planning and counseling than advocating and enforcing because
corporations seek to prevent complications before they arise.4°
The fact that businesses fear losing more than they would gain in
trade secrets litigation is a fourth reason the cases on appeal are
scarce.481 The hiring competitor might learn more from the
courtroom than from its new employee.' Moreover, the conflicting
testimony of expert witnesses regarding reverse engineering of the
information can be confusing and expensive.48 By the time the
parties are prepared for court, the emergency situation that triggered
the lawsuit may have passed.4
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the actual reasons why the NCTSPA is absent
are rare, he said, because good spies do not get caught, and those who are caught cannot
be defended, so they settle out of court. See id. Second, Mr. Blynn described cases where
two parties arrange an agreement to work together, such as through merger, but the plan
falls through. See id. Here the acquiring party knows everything about how the other
party works, and the other party may be entitled to relief, but only a few such cases have
arisen in North Carolina, he said. See id. The third category of cases is where employees
leave to work in the very same job for the competitor, and in computer cases the legal
strategy should be copyright law-a more powerful remedy-if it is available. See id. Yet
cases about customer information must be treated as trade secrets, and the plaintiff usually
will not prevail unless the information is very specialized. See id. Finally, Mr. Blynn
referred to high-level executive cases, a few of which he had in the advertising and
furniture fields, whereby the executive divulges information that is usually transitory in
nature, such as new marketing strategies. See id. He said a'loss at the injunction hearing
spells doom, because an appeal will take six months and all the secrets are lost. See id.
However, sometimes a corporation will agree to keep the executive from making decisions
for a year as part of a settlement. See id.
479. See Rikard Interview, supra note 465.
480. See, e.g., Ward Interview, supra note 465. Often an attorney will advise a manager
on the substance of an exit interview, for example, where the non-competition agreement
should be discussed again. See id.
481. See Rikard Interview, supra note 465. Mr. Rikard said a business would not want
to tell a competitor exactly what it had revealed to its former employee. See id. The
employee may be piecing together his or her memory of information from the former
place of employment, and litigation may facilitate that process. See id. Also, litigating
whether a concept can be reverse engineered requires testimony explaining exactly how to
create the secret concept by other means. See id; Olive Interview, supra note 461.
482. See Rikard Interview, supra note 465.
483. See id.
484. See Olive Interview, supra note 461.
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from most of the employment law cases in North Carolina where its
policies are implicated, this Comment concludes that the Act itself is
not flawed because neither its unique construction nor its case law
deviates fundamentally from the UTSA or trade secrets acts in other
states.48 Apparently many trade secrets cases are litigated as
breaches of covenants not to compete, given the conceptual overlap
between the two legal options and the greater abundance of cases
dealing with the non-compete agreements. 6  Other reasons
enunciated by practicing trade secrets attorneys probably contribute
to the paucity of NCTSPA references in published law.' In any
event, research on the statute and its resulting case law demonstrates
that the NCTSPA is an effective legal device for recovering or
retaining the commercial value of knowledge that has been or will be
misappropriated.
DAVID P. HATHAWAY
485. See supra notes 35-398 and accompanying text (exploring the NCTSPA and its
case law in contrast to the UTSA and trade secrets acts in other states).
486. See supra notes 399-464 and accompanying text (comparing covenant not to
compete law with trade secrets law).
487. See supra notes 465-84 and accompanying text (investigating the NCTSPA
through the eyes of the attorneys who use it).
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